



**The Commissioner for
Public Appointments**

ANNUAL REPORT

2014-15

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1. Commissioner's Foreword



It is 20 years this year since the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments was established, following a report in 1995 from the first Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Nolan.

Much has changed since that time but I am confident that, if they could revisit the subject now, Lord Nolan and his Committee would be pleased at the progress that has been made on their central recommendation that Ministerial appointments to public bodies should be made on the basis of merit. I well remember, as a middle-ranking civil servant pre-1995, the informality of the selection processes and the scope for people to be appointed on the basis of who they knew, rather than on their competence to do the job. The Nolan Committee stopped short of concluding that the system was shot through with patronage and favouritism. But it was concerned at “the lack of checks and balances on the exercise of Ministers’ considerable powers of patronage” and recommended the establishment of the Public Appointments Commissioner “to undertake the continued standard setting and monitoring that will enhance and sustain public confidence in the appointments process”.

This Annual Report is part of that on-going job of building and sustaining public confidence. Twenty years on from the establishment of my Office, it enables me to say with certainty that most Ministerial appointments to public bodies are now made, as the Nolan Committee recommended, after an open and fair process with candidates assessed by a selection panel against the published criteria for the role. I am also confident that the principle that Ministers should make their final choice from a list of those candidates assessed as suitable to carry out the role is well understood and generally accepted.

However, public confidence in the integrity and fairness of the public appointments process remains relatively fragile. It only takes a few examples of bad recruitment practice or of Ministers appointing political supporters to key roles to reignite the widespread public scepticism about public appointments, which the Nolan Committee perceived twenty years ago. As this report shows, there is cause for concern in a number of areas of current practice, which, if not checked, will put some of the progress of recent years into reverse.

The first area of concern, which is a recurring theme of this report, is the weakening capability of Government Departments to conduct effective and efficient selection processes. This is partly the result of resource constraints but it also reflects the lack of priority, which Departments give to filling key posts on public boards. The result can be formulaic, long drawn out recruitment processes with candidates kept waiting

for a decision, sometimes for weeks, even for months. If there is one message above all that existing board members and candidates for board roles want me to give to Ministers and their officials it is: please speed things up; of course these can sometimes be difficult decisions; but they do not get any easier by being left at the bottom of the in-tray for weeks.

Secondly, much more attention needs to be given to the diversity of the candidate field. As this report shows there has been excellent progress in appointing women to boards over the last five years, a tribute to the way the last Government energised the whole system to improve gender diversity.

However, overwhelmingly, those being appointed to boards are still more likely to be white, able-bodied and older. There needs to be a concerted attempt to widen the intake, to attract some younger people to public roles and to draw in different types of experience from the norm. There is an urgent need to remove the barriers which currently discourage those from black and minority ethnic backgrounds from applying for public roles and to understand what is stopping them from progressing in the competition, when they do apply. All this requires more than a bit of tinkering with role descriptions and advertising to a wider network of people, although that may also be helpful. Instead it calls for serious succession planning over a three to five year period. It means thinking much more widely about the kind of skills and experience, which boards need to reflect the public they serve; accepting that not everyone on a board needs to have been senior in the private sector; and that challenge and insight can come from many different quarters and backgrounds. It is human nature to want to recruit from those you know and from the circle with which you are comfortable. It will take brave leadership from the Government to break this mould.

Thirdly, the role of Ministers in public appointments is critical to public confidence; and section 4 of this report looks in some detail at the independence of selection panels and at the role of Ministers.


It is worth reiterating here that all the appointments covered by my remit are Ministerial appointments, for which Ministers are ultimately accountable to the public and Parliament. It is entirely appropriate, therefore, that they should be involved throughout the process and make the final choice from a list of candidates judged appointable by an independent panel. Political supporters of the Government can only be chosen if they get across this line of appointability. The latest figures show that the number of people being appointed who have declared political activity, is running at its lowest level since records began.

This is emphatically not a system rife with political patronage and personal favouritism. But there will always be temptations for Ministers and their advisers to intervene on behalf of those they know and those cases can have a disproportionate impact on public attitudes. It is imperative that Ministers and their officials continue to stand up publicly for the checks and balances, which Nolan put on their powers to appoint. It is important to trust the process. If an individual known to a Minister is competent against the requirements of the role, he or she will be assessed as such by the selection panel and Ministers can then appoint in the confidence that there

has been a rigorous assessment that they are capable of doing the job. That is the best way of building public confidence that the choice is based on a test of merit, not on personal favouritism.

These and other issues will, I am sure, be at the heart of the Government-appointed review of my Office, which at the time of writing, is being conducted by Sir Gerry Grimstone. My evidence to the Review gives my much fuller assessment of the progress that has been made than I am able to give in this short foreword and is available on my website.¹ It will, however, fall to my successor to implement the Review, since my five-year term of office as Commissioner comes to an end on 31 March 2016. My main wish for my successor, when he or she is appointed, is that there remains the independence, the resource and the political backing to continue the work which Lord Nolan and the Committee on Standards in Public Life set in train in 1995 and which is no less important today.

Finally, since this is my last annual report, I wish to pay particular tribute to all those who have supported me during my term of office: to our excellent Public Appointments Assessors, who are one of the unheralded success stories of the last five years; to our auditors, who have helped transform the professionalism of our compliance monitoring; and above all to Clare Salters, the Chief Executive, and her staff without whose wise advice and hard work I could not have done the job. I am immensely grateful to them all.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "David Normington". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

David Normington
Commissioner for Public Appointments

¹ <http://publicappointmentscommissioner.independent.gov.uk/ocpa-review/>

2. The Role of the Commissioner

2.1. What does the Commissioner do?

The Commissioner for Public Appointments regulates Ministerial appointments to public bodies and statutory office that fall within his remit. The Commissioner is independent of the Government and the Civil Service and is appointed by the Queen under an Order in Council. His remit is to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, diversity and equality of opportunity in the procedures for making public appointments, with the object of maintaining the principle of selection on merit after a fair, open and transparent process.

2.2. How does the Commissioner regulate public appointments?

The most recent Public Appointments Order in Council, which provides the legal basis of the Commissioner's role and powers, was made at the Privy Council in July 2015². The Commissioner regulates public appointments to nearly 300 national public bodies, as well as appointments to a significant number of local and regional bodies. The wide range of public bodies include:

- Executive non-Departmental public bodies
- Advisory non-Departmental public bodies
- Public corporations
- certain utility regulators
- NHS trusts
- National Park Authorities in England and Wales
- Conservation Boards of Areas of Outstanding National Beauty
- Community Care Councils in Wales
- National Park Authorities
- Independent Monitoring Boards
- certain non-Ministerial Departments

The Order in Council requires the Commissioner to publish a Code of Practice on the interpretation and application of the principle of selection on merit for public appointments. Appointing authorities are required to comply with the Code of Practice in making public appointments. The most recent Code of Practice³ came into effect on 1 April 2012

In addition to publishing a Code of Practice, the Commissioner carries out his duty of regulating public appointments by issuing additional guidance from time to time, investigating complaints referred to him, conducting regular audits of Departments' procedures, and producing an Annual Report.

²<http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Orders-in-Council-15-jul-15-Part-2.pdf>

³<http://publicappointmentscommissioner.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Code-of-Practice-20121.pdf>

Public Appointments Assessors (PAAs), recruited and accredited by the Commissioner, chair selection panels for the chairs of all public bodies within his remit and a small number of equivalent statutory office holders. They may also chair selection panels for other public appointments at the discretion of the Commissioner. Biographies of the thirteen PAAs are set out at Annex B.

Under the Order in Council the Commissioner can be given additional responsibilities relating to appointments. As described in section 4 of this report this includes responsibilities for overseeing appointments to the Recognition Panel, the overseeing body under the Royal Charter on self-regulation of the Press.

3. Summary of key issues arising in 2014-15

3.1. Highlights of 2014-15

This section summarises the main developments in 2014-15, which are reported in more detail later in the report.

- The highlight of the year is the continuing progress in the proportion of women being appointed to boards of public bodies. This reached 45.2% in 2014-15⁴. This compares with 34.7% in 2009-10 and represents a major step forward in improving the diversity of public bodies. There is also progress to report on the number of women being appointed to chair public boards, suggesting that, as the pool of women board members increases, it is providing an increasing number of excellent candidates for chairing roles. Later in this report there is a full analysis of the latest diversity statistics, which show less good progress on black and minority ethnic candidates and particularly disappointing results on disability. There is also interesting data on the age of board members which deserves some further reflection.
- The results of the annual compliance monitoring of Departments show a reasonable level of compliance with the requirements of the Code of Practice but it masks a continuing problem of poor practice in some Departments, which, while not a breach of the Code, damages confidence in the public appointments process. This is discussed in more detail later in the report. A particular issue, which has been the cause of regular complaints to the Commissioner, has been the length of time taken to bring competitions to a conclusion and the lack of communication with candidates about the reasons for delays. There is no doubt that this is putting off good candidates from applying.
- There continues to be disproportionate public and media interest in a few high profile appointments and in the role of Ministers in the process. This reached its height in the run up to the General Election with reports in the *Times* that Ministers were seeking to put their political supporters into key roles. This is discussed later in the report. Overall the number of successful candidates declaring that they are or have been politically active continues to decline. But it remains the case that a few high profile cases of politically active people being appointed to boards can have a disproportionate effect on public perceptions of the fairness of the appointments process.
- A significant proportion of the resources of the Office were taken up with the selection of the chair and members of the Recognition Panel for Press regulation established under the Royal Charter for Press self regulation. This was a role which the Government asked the Commissioner to take on and which he accepted in the public interest. The fact that the announcement of the appointments of the chair and members passed with so little comment, compared with the controversy surrounding the start of the process, was a measure of

⁴ 45.2% of appointments and reappointments of women where gender was known

success. However, it proved a considerable distraction from the main work of the Commissioner and his staff.

3.2. Review of the Office of the Commissioner

Towards the end of the Reporting Year in March 2015 the then Minister for the Cabinet Office announced a review of the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments, coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of the setting up of the Office in 1995. Following the General Election the new Cabinet Office Minister confirmed that the review would go ahead. The review is being carried out by Sir Gerry Grimstone, who has recently completed the triennial review of the Civil Service Commission. Its terms of reference are as follows:

The role of the Commissioner for Public Appointments was created by the Public Appointments Order in Council 1995 on 23 November 1995, following recommendations made by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (under the chairmanship of Lord Nolan). We are now twenty years on, and this provides a suitable opportunity to review the role of the Commissioner and the processes around public appointments. In the light of the range and diversity of public appointments, it is important to ensure that the procedures are both effective and proportionate and to review whether procedures as practised fit within the intentions of the Nolan principles. The review will be led by Sir Gerry Grimstone and will report to the Minister for the Cabinet Office.

The review is likely to report before the end of 2015 in time to inform the remit for the new Commissioner for Public Appointments, when he takes up his appointment in April 2016.

One impact of the setting up of the review has been a delay in the revision of the current Code of Practice, which was timetabled for the early part of 2015/16. The Commissioner's view was it made little sense to embark on that revision in advance of receiving the Review's conclusions, which could have significant implications for the present Code. However, as discussed later in this report, there are a number of issues relating to current departmental practice, which make a revision of the Code desirable as soon as possible.

The Commissioner and the Chief Executive gave written evidence to the review which is published on the Commissioner's website and can be accessed at <http://publicappointmentscommissioner.independent.gov.uk/ocpa-review/>

4. Performance against strategic objectives in 2014-15

4.1. The three objectives

The Commissioner's work has continued to be guided by the three objectives set out in his strategic framework, published in 2013.

These are:

OBJECTIVE ONE: working to improve outcomes in public appointments through the attraction of stronger and more diverse fields of candidates;

OBJECTIVE TWO: ensuring full and effective implementation of a more streamlined and less bureaucratic public appointments system;

OBJECTIVE THREE: improving understanding of the Commissioner's role and confidence that the public appointments system is delivering appointments on merit and free from patronage.

The rest of this chapter describes progress under each priority.

4.2. Objective 1: Improving Diversity

The promotion of more diverse boards of public bodies continues to be at the heart of the Commissioner's work. The aim has been to make it a central part of the Office's work, rather than an add-on. This includes:

- ensuring that in their chairing of competitions PAAs are constantly challenging long and shortlists which lack diversity, sometimes encouraging a renewed period of advertising or search where the field is particularly weak in this respect;
- monitoring the performance of search consultants, where they are used, and challenging those which fail to produce diverse lists of candidates;
- paying particular attention in the compliance monitoring and follow up to poor Departmental practice;
- shining a light on job descriptions and essential criteria, where they seem to deter the widest range of applicants;
- working with the Centre for Public Appointments in the Cabinet Office to spread best practice and to support Ministerial efforts to increase diversity.

The Commissioner also continues to look for opportunities to emphasise the importance of diverse boards in public statements and through the Office's website.

A good example was the launch of a short video in February 2015 entitled '*Becoming a Public Appointee*' which aims to attract a more diverse field of candidates to public appointments.

The video focuses on three women serving on Boards: one from a BME background, one female Chair and a wheelchair user who discuss their experience as public appointees. The organisations represented show a range of different sectors across the country.

Two of the participants had taken part in the round-table discussions on diversity held by the Commissioner in the previous year, the other had been suggested by one of the recruiting departments. The participants spoke about the reasons why they had chosen to apply for an appointment, the benefits it had brought not only to them, personally, but to the boards on which they serve. All spoke on the value of being involved in public life.

Government Departments were asked to circulate the video via social media and it has been hosted on the websites of organisations such as the Equalities and Human Rights Commission, Disability Rights UK and the National Governors Association. The PAAs also circulated it to their network of contacts.

A second video entitled "Public Appointments Assessors discuss the public appointment process" focused on the appointments process from the point of view of two PAAs. The PAAs discussed the importance of getting vacancies out to the widest audience and the way in which the whole process works, including the role that PAAs play. The video also provided a number of suggestions on making a good application. Both videos have been well received.


Government leadership, however, remains by far the most important influence on progress. Ministers in the Coalition Government made increasing the proportion of women on boards a particular priority between 2010 and 2015 setting an ambition to reach 50 per cent of women appointed to boards. This has had a galvanising effect on Government Departments and is a substantial part of the reason why so much progress (see below) has been made. It is very much to be wished that in the new Parliament the power of this leadership is directed to improving the proportions of black and minority ethnic members of boards and to tackling the very disappointing progress on disability.

4.2.1. Diversity of those appointed in 2014-15

The Commissioner published the latest Annual Survey of Ministerial Appointments and Reappointments in August 2015. As we set out below, this shows some important progress in some aspects of diversity, but less in others.

Gender

There is a really positive story to tell in terms of gender equality. The proportion of appointments where female candidates have been appointed has continued to increase (Figure 1), exceeding 45% for the first time. It is particularly encouraging this year that, not only has recent progress been sustained and improved on, but the gender divergence between new appointments and reappointments of the past three years has disappeared. 46% of reappointments were to women, compared with 44% of new appointments.




The proportion of chair appointments made to women lags a bit behind the proportion of member appointments. Last year, 36% of chair appointments (where gender was recorded) were made to women (34% of new appointments and 40% of reappointments). By contrast, 46% of member appointments were made to women (45% of new appointments and 47% of reappointments).


This compares to 23% of chair appointments (where gender was recorded) made to women in 2013-14 (23% of new appointments and 24% of reappointments) and 39% of member appointments were made to women (38% of new appointments and 35% of reappointments).

We have more detailed information about the application and appointment patterns for the majority of regulated competitions – all those other than the additional criminal justice bodies added to the Commissioner's remit in 2012. Within this group, 40% of new appointments were to women (42% of those for whom gender was known), so slightly below the overall figure.

The data show that the majority (55%) of applicants are male, compared with 30% who are female and 15% whose gender is unknown (Figure 2). Even if all the 'unknown' applicants were female, this still represents a disproportionately high number of male applicants relative to the population average. However, the proportion of female candidates is higher at interview stage (38%) and among those eventually appointed (40%).



Looked at another way (Figure 3), having actually applied, female applicants are significantly more successful than men at reaching the interview stage. There is no difference in the success rates of female and male interviewees who go on to be appointed.




It is interesting to reflect on what may be causing the difference in the success rates in the early stages of the competition. While it is possible that it reflects discrimination by selection panels at the sift stage, that seems unlikely given the wider evidence. Taken with the disproportionately high numbers of men who apply in the first place, the relatively high number of candidates whose gender is unknown and wider research that indicates that women are more likely than men to self-deselect (i.e. not apply), it is more likely to indicate that panels are being effective at weeding out less strong applicants at the sift stage. The fact that there are identical success rates for male and female candidates who reach the interview stage suggests that both the selection panels and the appointing Ministers are being even-handed in their treatment of male and female candidates.

All of these results suggest that the Government's aspiration to increase the proportion of women on the boards of public bodies has had real impact. While the appointment figures remain slightly below the Government's target of 50%, the improvements seen in recent years demonstrate that the target is within reach. This is excellent news.

Ethnicity


By contrast, the progress in increasing the proportion of appointments made to individuals from a Black, Asian or Minority Ethnic (BAME) background has made very limited progress over the past five years and remains, at 7.9%, well below the 14% figure in the wider population⁵ (Figure 4).



There have, however, been slight improvements in the proportion of chair appointments going to people from BAME backgrounds (Figure 5), which reached 8% this year, the highest yet. While this is movement in the right direction, it is

⁵ Using the 2011 Census for England and Wales as a proxy for the UK population.

important to keep the progress in perspective. The proportion may have risen to 8%, but this still only represents seven appointments.




So there is a long way to go before the boards of public bodies look as if they are reflective of the whole population they serve. Our evidence suggests that there are some substantial obstacles to progress.⁶

The first concern is that the proportion of applications for public appointment from people declaring a BAME background (8% - see Figure 6) is significantly lower than the proportion (14%⁷) of the wider population from a BAME background.

⁶ We looked at the same subset of competitions (new appointments) that we examined for gender i.e. excluding the additional criminal justice bodies added to the Commissioner's remit in 2012, for whom more limited data are available.

⁷ Using the age 18-69 population of England and Wales, as recorded in the 2011 Census, as a proxy for the wider UK population.




The reason for the low BAME application rate is unclear: it could be that people from a BAME background are less likely to apply for a public appointment; or it could be that people are reluctant to declare their BAME background when applying.⁸ Either way, this is a challenge that needs to be overcome, by increasing confidence in BAME communities that their applications for public appointments will be welcomed and taken seriously.

Looking at success rates at various stages of the process (Figure 7) it is encouraging to see that proportion of BAME applicants who go on to be appointed (2.0%) is similar to other applicants (white or unknown ethnicity, 2.2%). However, given the low BAME application rates in the first place, all this means is that the outcome is not worse than the starting point.

But that is not the full picture. The Commissioner was very concerned to see that those candidates declaring a BAME background appear significantly less likely to be invited to interview than others (18% of BAME applicants were invited to interview, compared with 25% of other applicants). And while BAME candidates are more likely to be successful at interview compared to others, the difference is not statistically significant.

⁸ The data for the early stages of the process do not differentiate between 'white' and 'unknown ethnicity' but, based on the proportion of 'unknowns' among *appointees*, it is likely that there is at least a similarly high proportion at application stage.




The fact that slightly higher proportions of BAME interviewees go on to be appointed suggests that there is no deliberate attempt by selection panels or appointing Ministers to discriminate against those from a BAME background. If there were, we would be likely to see a lower proportion of BAME than other interviewees successfully being appointed. That, at least, is reassuring.

But something appears to be happening at the sift stage that is leading to proportionately fewer BAME applicants being invited to interview. This could reflect a higher number of weaker applications from applicants who declare a BAME background – as with the lower self-de-selection rates for men suggested above. But that seems unlikely given the overall low BAME application rates. If that is ruled out, it seems that panels may be less likely – on paper at least – to rate the skills or experience of BAME applicants as highly as that of other applicants.

We also compared the outcome of competitions for appointments to ‘national’ bodies with the outcome of those for more local bodies (such as local NHS health trusts or the independent monitoring boards of individual prisons). Although the diversity profile of each group was similar for gender, age and disability, there were significant differences for ethnicity.

We had expected some difference on the grounds that the BAME population of the UK is not spread evenly across the country. As many national bodies are based in London, which has the highest BAME population, we had expected national appointments to be more ethnically mixed than local ones.

In fact, the reverse was true: the proportion of appointments at national level made to people from a BAME background was significantly lower than the proportion at local level (Figure 8).




Taken together, the picture on ethnic diversity in public appointments is worrying. Although there is no difference in the success rates of BAME candidates and others who reach the interview stage of a competition, overall, people from a BAME background are less likely than others:


- to *apply* for public appointments (or are fearful of disclosing their ethnic identity when they do);
- to be *invited* to interview; and
- to be appointed to a *national* body rather than a local one.

Disability

Diversity in terms of disability appears to have declined slightly in recent years (Figure 9).




Looking in more detail at the subset of new appointments for which we have data about different stages of the competition process, we can see that 6.5% of candidates applying for a public appointment declared a disability (Figure 10), significantly lower than the proportion of working-age adults declaring a disability (16%⁹), suggesting either that people with disabilities are less likely to apply for public appointments or that many are unwilling to declare their disability.



Having applied, candidates declaring a disability appear to do significantly less well throughout the process (Figure 11).

⁹ Family Resources Survey 2010-11.




It is hard to be sure of the reason for these significantly poorer outcomes. Some – though by no means all – disabilities can affect people’s ability to do a job. But given the nature of public appointments, which are non-executive governance roles on the boards of public bodies rather than executive roles we would expect this to be less of a factor here than with, for example, recruitment to executive employment.

The data do not indicate which competitions have operated the Guaranteed Interview Scheme (GIS), whereby candidates with a disability who meet the minimum criteria are guaranteed an interview. We will look to collect that data next year to examine whether the operation of the GIS makes a material difference to the way in which applicants with disabilities fare in competitions for public appointments.

Age

As Figure 12 shows, there has been quite a marked shift in the age profile of public appointees over the past six years – at least within the portion of appointments where age is known. In 2009-10, the majority of appointees (84%) were aged between 46 and 65. That proportion had shrunk to 65% by 2014-15. There has also been a decline in the proportion of appointees aged 36 to 45 (down from 11% to 7.6%). Overall, the average age has increased.

By contrast, there has been a small increase in the proportion of appointees aged 35 and under and a much more marked increase in the proportion of appointees aged 66 and over.



While this is understandable, given that public bodies usually serve the whole population (or a substantial proportion of it) it would be desirable to have a better spread of age groups on boards.

4.3. Objective 2: Streamlining the public appointments system

The Code of Practice, which came into operation in April 2012, represented a major scaling back of the prescription in the system. The new approach was principles based. The emphasis was on Departments and their Ministers being held to account against three main principles for public appointments: openness, fairness and merit. Prescription and detailed guidance was reduced to the minimum and Departments were given considerable freedom to devise selection processes, which were proportionate to the nature of the appointment being made. In this way the regulatory system was stripped back closer to the original recommendations in the 1995 report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (under Lord Nolan's Chairmanship) which recommended the setting up of the Office of the Commissioner.

This section describes how the system continues to develop and provides some commentary on how Departments are using the freedoms, which the new system provides. The main way the system is monitored is through PAAs chairing all selection panels for the appointment of chairs of public boards; compliance monitoring carried out under contract with KPMG; and consideration of complaints.


4.3.1. Chairing the most significant public appointments

The Code of Practice requires PAAs to chair the selection panels for all public appointments campaigns to appoint a Chair. This replaced the previous requirement for independent assessors to sit on all selection panels. The aim was to focus on the highest profile appointments, thus reinforcing public confidence that appointments were made on merit, free from patronage.

A subsidiary aim was to set the standards in the appointment of chairs, which could then be followed in member competitions. The role of the PAA is to ensure that the process of selection follows the Code of Practice but they can also add significant value to the selection process by bringing their experience of best practice in recruitment, by challenging poor practice and by encouraging Departments and search consultants (if used) to generate a stronger and more diverse field of candidates.

This part of the system is working exceptionally well. The team of PAAs is strong, experienced and diverse in every respect. They invariably receive good feedback from Departments for their chairing skills and their added value. Where they are criticised, it is usually because they have insisted on good practice and pushed back at attempts to cut corners or circumvent the requirements of the Code. 79 competitions chaired by PAAs were completed in 2014-15, including 25 competitions carried over from 2013-14 which represents 3.9% of the total new public appointments for the year. A further 24 competitions were commenced but not concluded by the end of the reporting year. A list of the completed competitions can be seen at Annex C.

As Figure 13 demonstrates, Ministers were given a choice of more than one appointable candidate in 73% of competitions for Chair posts.



An analysis of the reports produced by assessors at the end of competitions shows three recurring themes. The first is a reluctance from Departments to cast the net wide in terms of both search and advertising and an unwillingness, because of cost

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concerns, to use search consultants. This can be counterproductive in competitions where there is likely to be difficulty in attracting suitable candidates and sometimes results in delays while the advertising or search is rerun. In 23% of competitions, panels found only one candidate to be appointable and in a further 2.5% of competitions there were no appointable candidates found.

Secondly, the selection process is often in the hands of inexperienced sponsor teams who have rarely or never run selection processes before. One effect of this can be to fall back on cumbersome processes and to rely too much on formal interviews as the sole means of selection.

Thirdly, selection processes are too often long and drawn out, with little indication for candidates as to the reasons for this. There is rarely a tight timetable with a senior person responsible for ensuring it is kept to. Consultations with Ministers take too long.

4.3.2. Other public appointments

Prior to 2012 an independent assessor sat in on every selection panel, but this requirement was abolished when the new Code of Practice came in to effect. This put a new onus on the effectiveness of compliance monitoring which is in the capable hands of KPMG and the staff of the Office of the Commissioner.

The total number of public appointments covered by the Commissioner's remit in 2014-15 was 1,888 (new appointments and reappointments). This is lower than the 2,150 made in 2013-14. The figures include 699 appointments and reappointments made to Independent Monitoring Boards (IMB), which came into the Commissioner's remit in 2012. There has been a small increase in the number of IMB appointments from the 654 made in the previous year.

The Code of Practice permits Ministers to make reappointments provided there has been a satisfactory appraisal but prevents an individual from serving in any one post for more than ten years, except in exceptional circumstances.

Of the 1,888 public appointments made in 2014-15, 881 (some 47%) were reappointments. This compares broadly to the same level last year when 48% of total public appointments were reappointments.

A fuller analysis of the results of the compliance monitoring of these appointments is contained in the next section on Accountability. Many of the issues arising are the same as those noted by PAAs. While compliance is satisfactory, the capability of Departments to conduct efficient, timely appointments processes is very variable.

4.3.3. Exemptions from the Code of Practice

An important element in the flexibility of the system is the power of the Commissioner to agree, in exceptional circumstances, exemptions to the requirements of the Code of Practice where he believes that it is justified in the public interest. Usually such approval is given on the grounds of practicality or urgent operational need: for example, allowing a Chair to continue in post to see a

public body through to closure, or where a Board member has unexpectedly stepped down and needs to be replaced immediately pending a full, fair and open competition.

The Commissioner granted 46 specific exemptions under the Code of Practice in 2014-15 and declined one. A full list of the exemptions that were granted and the circumstances in which they were given can be found at Annex D.

The Commissioner has also agreed to a number of class exemptions, where appointments or reappointments can be made to certain public bodies without following the exact requirements of the Code of Practice and without his specific agreement.

These class exemptions are listed below:

- flexibilities allowing the NHS Trust Development Authority to manage appointments pragmatically throughout the transition of NHS trusts to Foundation Trust status. These flexibilities allow the appointment of candidates to local health trust boards who have already been appointed to another local health trust through an open competition, or who have been on a reserve list for no more than 24 months. The NHS TDA has additionally been granted authority to reappoint members originally appointed under these flexibilities and is required to report back to the Commissioner on the use of these flexibilities every quarter;
- a dispensation meaning that all current members of IMBs in the prisons sector (including members of Military Corrective Training Centre Independent Monitoring Boards) can serve for a maximum term of 15 years (as opposed to the standard Code maximum of 10 years). This dispensation has been agreed by the Commissioner in recognition of the fact that these are unpaid roles where accumulated experience is important and it can be difficult to attract replacements; and
- agreement that appointments of chairs of Advisory Committees on Justices of the Peace, should be exempt from the Code to allow longstanding arrangements for making those appointments (where the chairs are chosen by the members) to continue.

4.3.4. Complaints

The number of formal complaints to the Commissioner remains low. This is partly because he will only normally investigate a complaint after it has been considered by the Department concerned.

In 2014-15 there were five complaints made to Departments under the Code. Only one complaint was made to the Commissioner's office; as this had not previously been considered by the Department, we asked the complainant to raise it with the Department first. This compares to 11 complaints made to Departments under the Code of Practice, in the previous year, five of which were dealt with by the Commissioner.

In addition to these formal complaints the Commissioner receives a number of informal comments on Departmental processes. Indeed he will actively seek these out both from individuals and organisations. There have been four recurring themes in such comments during 2014-15.

The first has been about the lack of communication both with outgoing chairs about their futures and with candidates during prolonged and delayed competitions. Some of this has been discourteous in the extreme. It is an unacceptable way to treat people who are interested in giving public service often at little or no remuneration.

Secondly, there have been numerous complaints about the length of the competition process.

Thirdly, there have been questions about the composition of panels, particularly when those who are politically active have participated.

Finally, there have been questions about the role of Ministers and whether their interventions have affected the fairness of the process.

None of these have become formal complaints, but they have often come from senior individuals who say that they have been put off applying for roles in the future.

4.3.5. Monitoring Compliance with the Code of Practice

The Commissioner has a legal duty, under the terms of the Order in Council 2015, to audit public appointments and policies used by appointing Departments to verify that the principles of merit, fairness and openness are followed.

The data collection and much of the analysis for this compliance monitoring work has been contracted out, most recently (since April 2013) to KPMG through a combined contract, which covers compliance monitoring of Civil Service recruitment for the Civil Service Commission. As well as fulfilling the Commissioner's legal duty, the compliance work enables the Commissioner to pick up systemic developments in public appointments practice and to note, identify and spread good practice and mitigate risks of future non-compliance.

There are four risk ratings to assess Departments:

GREEN	Indicators suggest minor or no compliance risk to the organisation and minor or no concerns with the capability to achieve successful appointments
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AMBER/GREEN	Indicators suggest moderate compliance risk to the organisation and/or moderate concerns with capability to achieve successful appointments
AMBER/RED	Indicators suggest significant compliance risk to the organisation and/or significant concerns with capability to achieve successful appointments
RED	Indicators suggest major compliance risks to the organisation or actual breach of the principles and/or major concerns with capability to achieve successful appointments

On the basis of a range of quantitative and qualitative data supplied by Departments, all 21 Departments that make regulated appointments are assessed. In some cases (10 over the past year), where the initial data indicated potentially high risk, a follow-up visit is undertaken before the final risk rating is determined.

Based on the original appointments data for 2013-14 and, in most cases, more recent data relating to appointments made in 2014-15, the majority of Departments were assessed as either 'green' (three Departments, 14%) or 'green/amber' (13 Departments, 62%).

There were, five Departments (24%) assessed as having significant or major risks ('amber/red'¹⁰ or 'red'¹¹). The most serious issue in the red-rated Departments was the lack of documentary evidence of key decisions taken and therefore of a transparent process based on the Code principles. These 'red' and 'amber/red' Departments accounted for 42% of the appointments made last year. That is not to say that the majority of appointments were made in contravention of the Code, but the scope for the Code's provisions to be missed is high. This is obviously a matter of concern and something that the Commissioner will be monitoring carefully in the year ahead.

¹⁰ Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice and HM Treasury

¹¹ Department for Communities & Local Government

The final risk ratings for 2014-15 were as follows:

DEPARTMENT	FINAL RISK RATING
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)	RED
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)	RED
Cabinet Office	AMBER / RED
HM Treasury (HMT)	AMBER / RED
Ministry of Defence (MOD)	AMBER / RED
Ministry of Justice (MOJ)	AMBER/ RED
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)	AMBER / GREEN
Department for Education (DfE)	AMBER / GREEN
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)	AMBER / GREEN
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)	AMBER / GREEN
Department of Health (DH)	AMBER / GREEN
Department for Transport (DfT)	AMBER / GREEN
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)	AMBER / GREEN
Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD)	AMBER / GREEN
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)	AMBER / GREEN
Home Office	AMBER / GREEN
Scotland Office	AMBER / GREEN

DEPARTMENT	FINAL RISK RATING
Welsh Government	AMBER / GREEN
Department for International Development (DfID)	GREEN
NHS Trust Development Authority (NHS TDA)	GREEN
Northern Ireland Office	GREEN

A number of general findings can be drawn from the 2014-15 compliance round:

- Documentation: issues were identified with the quality and availability at most visited organisations, including some being insufficient to support the decisions made over the course of the campaign;
- Diversity: although the completion of the diversity monitoring forms by candidates was generally good across the Departments which were reviewed, the activities to widen the applicant field were generally directed towards gender equalities above any other under represented groups;
- Merit lists: there is still evidence that selection panels are recommending a “top” candidate to Ministers, or providing merit lists, rather than providing a list of appointable and non-appointable candidates;
- Workforce planning: all Departments perform tracking and succession planning of public appointments with varying degrees of sophistication but there was evidence to show that extensions and reappointments would not have been required if sufficient horizon scanning had been undertaken and action to fill vacancies started sooner.

It is disappointing to note that these same issues were raised in the 2013-14 report and Departments were made aware of the need to make improvements in these areas. Despite this, it appears that instances of this nature are still occurring. This may be due to a decrease in capability levels for public appointments teams against a backdrop of diminishing levels of staffing across the Civil Service.

From April 2015 the way that Departments report their public appointments data to the Commissioner has changed. Instead of Departments providing an annual return, KPMG will now collect the data on a quarterly basis. From the Commissioner’s perspective, this should give a quicker indication of progress or problems, which will enable earlier intervention where needed. In addition, Annual Reports will be able to report audited assessments of recruitment during the reporting year rather than retrospective reporting of appointments made a year or more previously.

4.3.6. Breaches of the Code of Practice in 2014-15

The following cases were identified as breaches of the Code of Practice in 2014-15:

- Ministry of Justice made an interim chair appointment to the Youth Justice Board but failed to seek the Commissioner's prior approval to making this appointment without competition;
- Ministry of Justice failed to declare the political activity of a candidate who was appointed to the Youth Justice Board;
- Cabinet Office advertised a post stating that they were operating the Guaranteed Interview Scheme (GIS), but did not do so. It is not a requirement to operate the GIS, but the Code requires Departments to follow the process they have said they will operate;
- HM Treasury merged two posts on the board of UK Financial Investments and made a new appointment without prior approval. (the post of Non Executive Chair and Chief Executive were merged into a new Chair Executive position appointment);
- DCMS failed to publish the declared political activity of three candidates when they were appointed.

4.3.7. Working with Departments

Beyond the formal compliance monitoring the Commissioner and his office work extensively with Departments to offer advice and guidance and to spread best practice. A good example of this has been the continuing work with the TDA to improve the recruitment of chairs of health trusts in the NHS in England. Another has been the work, which continues, to tackle weaknesses in the recruitment practices of the Department for Culture Media and Sport. Although this arose from concerns about failures in compliance, it has extended into advising on guidance for teams doing recruitment and a seminar for some key DCMS staff.

There have also been continued good relations with the Cabinet Office's Centre for Public Appointments. However, the Centre has not yet fully fulfilled its promise as a force for spreading good practice across Government.

4.4. Objective 3: Building public confidence

A central objective of the Commissioner's role remains to improve public confidence that the public appointments system is delivering appointments on merit free from political or personal patronage. He does this by

- open reporting of his findings and decisions through his website and Annual Report. This contains a news section and a list of relevant publications. Significant communications with Government are generally made public;

- joining in public debates and discussions through the media and his Twitter account. A good example of this during 2014-15 was the several letters to the Press about the progress of the competition to select a new Chair of the BBC Trust, correcting mis-reporting about alleged Ministerial involvement in the selection process;
- reporting to Parliament through the Select Committee on Public Administration. Unusually, because of the impending General Election, the Commissioner did not make his annual appearance before the Committee, but he remained in informal contact with the Chair and secretariat. The relationship between the Commissioner and the Select Committee is an important means by which OCPA's independence is reinforced.

The Commissioner also submitted evidence to the Public Affairs Select Committee's inquiry: *Who's accountable? Relationships between Government and arms-length bodies*. The Commissioner's evidence can be found at

<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/Public%20Administration/Accountability%20of%20Quangos%20and%20Public%20Bodies/written/9000.html>

The Committee's Report concluded that public appointment procedures, including reappointment procedures, remained obscure in many cases and they called on the Government to list the unregulated public appointments not overseen by the Commissioner, and to set out why some appointments are regulated and the rest are not. Unfortunately the Government declined to do so.

4.4.1. Is public confidence increasing?

There is no doubt that over a twenty year time scale the role of the Commissioner has been essential in establishing the principle that public appointments should be made on merit after a fair and open process, rather than through favouritism or patronage. However, some of the "widespread scepticism" among the public about the fairness and integrity of the process, which led Lord Nolan to propose the establishment of the Office of the Commissioner in 1995, remains. In the view of the Commissioner, there are four areas of risk to public confidence:

A. Departmental capability

The earlier sections of this report have commented on weaknesses in Departmental performance, leading to formulaic selection processes, long delays in making appointments and poor communications with candidates. These put off some of the best applicants and can create the impression that Departments are not serious enough about finding strong and diverse fields of candidates. The main reason for this is the lack of resources now devoted to public appointments, with the majority of Departmental central appointments teams abolished and selection processes left in the hands of inexperienced sponsor teams.

Some Departments are beginning to see that this lack of priority to public appointments is counterproductive. The DCMS, for example, have begun to rebuild their central expertise and given a senior official oversight of their selection processes. The Ministry of Justice is putting extra resource into widening the field of potential applicants. However, until others follow suit, this remains a vulnerable area both in terms of the integrity of the selection processes and public confidence in it.

B. Composition of panels

The composition of selection panels is an important contributor to public confidence that the selection process is fair and impartial. The Code of Practice requires that the panel must be able to assess candidates impartially against the selection criteria and include a member who is independent of the appointing Department and the body to which the appointment was made.

There is evidence from the past year that Departments do not give enough attention to establishing panels which will naturally command public confidence. One case which became public and was the subject of a report from the House of Commons Select Committee on Justice concerned the selection of HM Inspector of Prisons. In this instance the panel included a former Government Minister, the holder of a party office (who was designated as the independent member) and a senior civil servant from the Ministry making the appointment. This did not break the strict letter of the Code, nor was there any suggestion that the two politically active appointees behaved improperly in any way. However, as the Commissioner commented to the Select Committee: *"It does not aid public confidence in the public appointments process to have an independent member who is an active member of a political party or indeed to have two panel members, who are so politically associated with the Government."*¹²

The Commissioner had intended to include new provisions on panel composition in his next revise of the Code of Practice, but, as noted above, this has been delayed until after the Grimstone review reports. But this is not just about the provisions of the Code. Departments must apply a common sense interpretation of independence in choosing panel members and have greater regard to providing public reassurance about the integrity of selection panels.

C. Ministerial involvement

There continues to be public scepticism about the role of Ministers in public appointments and an unshakable belief in some media and public comment that significant appointments are invariably subject to improper Ministerial influence, even when the evidence is totally to the contrary. Just before the General Election the *Times* carried a story alleging that Ministers were seeking to "reward" their supporters with public office before the Election and listing a series of appointments which had allegedly been given to politically active individuals.

¹² Extract from a letter to the Chairman of the Justice Select Committee from the Commissioner

An investigation by the Commissioner's office discovered some shortcomings in procedures and breaches of the Code of Practice which are listed in paragraph 4.3.6 and were discussed with the Permanent Secretary at DCMS.

More generally, there are three points to make about Ministerial involvement in public appointments.

First, in most cases, public appointments are made properly and fairly after assessment of a candidate's suitability and without any improper Ministerial influence or involvement. The facts also show that the proportion of successful candidates declaring that they are politically active is in steady decline and at its lowest level since records were kept.

Secondly, it is not sufficiently understood that these are Ministerial appointments and Ministers make the final choice of candidate from a list of appointable candidates drawn up by a selection panel. This means that there is nothing to stop a Minister choosing a political supporter if he or she passes the selection panel's test of appointability. In any year, therefore, there are a small number of politically active individuals appointed, perfectly properly, to public roles.

Thirdly, there have continued in the past year to be an equally small number of cases where Ministers (or civil servants on their behalf) exert pressure on panels to put favoured candidates on to short lists, to assess them as appointable or to reconsider unfavourable decisions. This happens both in competitions which are chaired by a PAA and in member competitions where there is no OCPA representative present. Where such cases come to light, they are challenged, investigated and, where possible, resisted. They are part of the justification for retaining an effective system of regulation.

D. More diverse outcomes

Finally, the best way to build public confidence is to ensure better and more diverse outcomes from selection processes. The Commissioner has continued to receive comment from underrepresented groups, like black and minority ethnic individuals, that they do not believe public appointments are for them. A concerted effort is needed by Governments Departments to prove them wrong.

4.5. Building OCPA's Capability

4.5.1. Supporting the Commissioner

David Normington took up his appointment as Commissioner for Public Appointments, and also First Civil Service Commissioner, from April 2011. He is supported, in his dual roles as Commissioner for Public Appointments and First Civil Service Commissioner, by a joint secretariat provided by the Civil Service Commission.

The secretariat also provides strategic and administrative support to the House of Lords Appointments Commission and the Advisory Committee on Business

Appointments. The Secretariat staff are all civil servants on secondment. Further details are provided on our website or in the Civil Service Commission's Annual Report.

4.5.2. Expenditure

Funding for the Commissioner's office is included within the budget of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission's audit accounts are published on its website.¹³

The cost of running the Commissioner's office has been artificially inflated over the past two years because of the additional Royal Charter work that is now complete. We have therefore reported on expenditure for core work and Royal Charter work separately below.

Core expenditure – including staff salaries, payments to the Commissioners, fees to PAAs and accommodation and other service charges paid to the Cabinet Office - totalled £338,000 in the reporting period (£352,000 in 2013-14).

The largest elements of expenditure in 2014-15, as in previous years, were staff costs (£115,000) and the cost of the compliance monitoring audit contract with KPMG (£105,000). David Normington's remuneration as dual post holder remained at £85,000 (unchanged since 2011-12), of which approximately 40% in this reporting period related to his work as the Commissioner for Public Appointments.


Expenditure on work relating to the Royal Charter on self-regulation of the press came to £180,000 during 2014-15 (£171,000 in 2013-14). This additional funding was provided by the Government to enable the Commissioner and his office to fulfil the duties set out in the Royal Charter.

4.5.3. Efficiency and Effectiveness

As Figure 14 shows, OCPA core expenditure is at its lowest level since the office was first established.

¹³ http://civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/2903922-CSC-Annual-Report_Accessible-v0.2.pdf

Figure 14
OCA annual expenditure, 1996-2015



We continue to look at ways in which we can improve the efficiency of our operation. This year we have worked with our compliance monitoring auditor, KPMG, to agree ways in which we can adjust the balance of effort between them and our own staff to improve our audit reach for less cost. We have increasingly taken on some of the compliance monitoring visits in-house and will continue to look at ways in which we can develop our in-house capacity while retaining the analytical expertise that KPMG provide.

We also aim to provide an efficient service to our external stakeholders in processing casework effectively. We have targets to respond to queries from Departments and the public within three working days and deal with requests for exemptions from the Code of Practice in five working days.

There were requests for 47 exemptions during 2014-15, of which 46 were granted by the Commissioner. 77% of these requests were dealt with within five working days. Most other queries are received by email or telephone and are dealt with immediately or within 24 hours. Any complaints received are acknowledged and confirmed whether they are in scope in three working days with a substantive response being provided to those who are within 15 working days.

5. Royal Charter on self-regulation of the Press

Following the Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice and ethics of the press, a Royal Charter on the self regulation of the press was granted by the Privy Council on 30 October 2013. The Royal Charter established a Recognition Panel with functions and duties relating to the recognition of press industry self regulators in accordance with the terms of the Charter and also gives the Commissioner certain appointment-related functions.

In December 2013, the Commissioner was asked by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, to oversee the selection of an Appointments Committee which in turn would make the appointments to the Board of the Recognition Panel. The Charter required that this appointment process would be conducted in a fair and open way and that the appointments were made on merit.

The Charter also gave the Commissioner a role in validating that any future appointments made to the Board of the Recognition Panel would also be made in a fair and open way and on the basis of merit. The Charter allowed the Commissioner's office to support the work of the Appointments Committee.

The Charter required the Appointments Committee to be chaired by a PAA. This role was undertaken by Dame Anne Pringle, former British Ambassador to Moscow and a current PAA. The other members of the Appointments Committee were Dr Chitra Bharucha, former Vice-Chair of the BBC Trust and former member of the General Medical Council; Andrew Flanagan, former Chief Executive of the Scottish Media Group and current Civil Service Commissioner; and Elizabeth France, former Information Commissioner and former Chair of the Office for Legal Complaints.

The Appointments Committee launched a competition to appoint the Chair of the Board of the Recognition Panel in February 2014. In June 2014, the Appointments Committee appointed David Wolfe as the first Chair of the Recognition Panel. He subsequently worked alongside the Appointments Committee to oversee the appointment of the other members of the Recognition Panel Board.

In October 2014, the Appointments Committee appointed five other members of the Board of the Recognition Panel. These were: Harry Cayton, Emma Gilpin-Jacobs, Carolyn Regan, Harry Rich and Tim Suter. These appointments concluded the work of the Appointments Committee in relation to the 'initial appointments' to the Board and on 3 November 2014 the Recognition Panel was formally established, ending the Commissioner's and the Appointments Committee's involvement in the initial appointments work under the Charter.

Expenditure on work relating to the Royal Charter came to £180,000 during 2014-15. This additional funding was provided by the Government to enable the Commissioner and his office to fulfil the duties set out in the Royal Charter.

The Commissioner's functions under the Royal Charter are 'additional functions' and were carried out under Article 4 of the Public Appointments Order in Council.

Annex A: Public Appointments Assessors



Mark Addison



Sarah Anderson



Stephen Bubb



Olivia Grant



Michael Kaltz



John Knight



Sara Nathan



Anne Pringle



Margaret Scott



Amerdeep Somal



Peter Spencer



Rosie Varley



Libby Watkins

Annex B: Appointment competitions chaired by Public Appointments Assessors in 2014-15

Department	Public body	Role	Public Appointments Assessor	Appointed Candidates
BIS	National Physical Laboratory	Chair	John Knight	David Grant
BIS	Post Office	Chair	Margaret Scott	Tim Parker
CO	Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists	Chair	Sara Nathan	Alison White
CO	Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA)	Chair	Margaret Scott	Baroness Angela Browning
CO	ACOBA	Member	Margaret Scott	Terence Jagger & John Wood
CO	Review Body on Senior Salaries	Chair	Margaret Scott	Martin Read
CPS	Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate	HM Chief Inspector	Margaret Scott	Kevin McGinty
DCLG	Ebbsfleet Development Corporation	Chair	John Knight	Michael Cassidy
DCLG	The Leasehold Advisory Service	Chair	Libby Watkins	Roger Southam
DCLG	Housing Ombudsman	Chair	Sara Nathan	Denise Fowler
DCLG	Building Regulations Advisory Committee	Chair	Sarah Anderson	Fiona Waller
DCMS	Science Museum Group	Chair	Sir Peter Spencer	Mary Archer
DCMS	BBC Trust	Chair	Mark Addison	Rona Fairhead
DCMS	National Heritage Memorial Fund	Chair	Amerdeep Somal	Sir Peter Luff
DCMS	Wallace Collection	Chair	Sir Peter Spencer	Antonio Horta Osoria

Department	Public body	Role	Public Appointments Assessor	Appointed Candidates
DCMS	Historic Royal Palaces	Chair	Olivia Grant	Rupert Gavin
DCMS	Theatre Trust	Chair	Amerdeep Somal	Tim Eyles
DCMS	Sports Ground Safety Authority	Chair	Dame Anne Pringle	Alan Coppin
DCMS	Victoria and Albert Museum	Chair	John Knight	Nicolas Coleridge
DECC	Fuel Poverty Advisory Board	Chair	Michael Kaltz	Tom Wright
DECC	Oil & Gas Authority	Chair	Mark Addison	Patrick Brown
DEFRA	Consumer Council for Water	Chair	Dame Anne Pringle	Alan Lovell
DEFRA	Regional Flood and Coastal Committee - Trent	Chair	John Knight	Vijith Randeniya
DEFRA	Regional Flood and Coastal Committee - Wessex	Chair	John Knight	David Jenkins
DEFRA	Regional Flood and Coastal Committee - Yorkshire	Chair	John Knight	Colin Mellors
DEFRA	Regional Flood and Coastal Committee - Anglia Northern	Chair	John Knight	Edward Poll
DFE	School Teachers Review Body	Chair	Olivia Grant	Patricia Rice
DFE	Children's Commissioner	Commissioner	Olivia Grant	Anne Longfield
DFE	OFSTED	Chair	Sir Peter Spencer	David Hoare
DFID	Commonwealth Scholarship Commission	Chair	Amerdeep Somal	Richard Middleton
DFID	Chief Commissioner - Independent Commission on Aid Impact	Commissioner	John Knight	Alison Evans

Department	Public body	Role	Public Appointments Assessor	Appointed Candidates
DFT	Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee	Chair	Michael Kaltz	Keith Richards
DFT	Chair of Passenger Focus	Chair	Michael Kaltz	Jeff Halliwell
DH	Chair of NHS Pensions Board	Chair	Sarah Anderson	Rachel Court
DWP	National Employment Savings Trust	Chair	Mark Addison	Otto Thoresen
DWP	Pension Ombudsman	Other	Olivia Grant	Anthony Arter
DWP	The Pensions Advisory Service	Chair	Rosie Varley	David Harker
FCO	Great Britain China Centre	Chair	Sir Peter Spencer	Martin Davidson
HO	The Gangmasters Licensing Authority	Members	Rosie Varley	Simon Albutt, Bill Butler, Angela Coleshill, Linda Dickens, Marshall Evans, Paul Williams
HO	Anti-Slavery Commissioner	Anti-Slavery Commissioner	Rosie Varley	Kevin Hyland
HO	Technical Advisory Board	Chair	Amerdeep Somal	Jonathan Hoyle
HO	HM Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC)	HM Inspector	Margaret Scott	Wendy Williams
HO	HMIC	HM Inspector	Margaret Scott	Mike Cunningham
HSE	Advisory Committee on Pesticides	Chair	Sir Stephen Bubb	Professor William Cushley
MOD	Service Complaints Commissioner	Service Complaints Commissioner	Margaret Scott	Nicola Williams
MOD	Veterans Advisory and Pensions Committee	Chair to their Eastern branch	Margaret Scott	Jonathan Jelley

Department	Public body	Role	Public Appointments Assessor	Appointed Candidates
MOD	Nuclear Research Advisory Council	Chair	Sarah Anderson	Professor Steven Rose
MOJ	Law Commission	Chair of the Law Commission	Libby Watkins	Lord Justice Bean
MOJ	Chief Inspector of Prisons	Chief Inspector of Prisons	Dame Anne Pringle	Minister declined to appoint
MOJ	The Prisoner Escort and Custody Services	Chair	Rosie Varley	Anthony Fitzsimmons
MOJ	Judicial Pension Board	Chair	Mark Addison	Jill Youds
MOJ	Administrative Justice Advisory Group	Chair	Olivia Grant	Jodi Berg
NHS TDA	Southport & Ormskirk Hospital NHS Trust	Chair	Libby Watkins	Sue Musson
NHS TDA	Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Trust	Chair	Sarah Anderson	Jagtar Singh
NHS TDA	North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust	Chair	Libby Watkins	Wyn Dignan
NHS TDA	Lincolnshire Community NHS Trust	Chair	Rosie Varley	Elaine Baylis
NHS TDA	West London Mental Health NHS Trust	Chair	Rosie Varley	Tom Hayhoe
NHS TDA	East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust Chair	Chair	Libby Watkins	Pauline Tagg
NHS TDA	Dudley and Walsall Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust Chair	Chair	Sara Nathan	Danielle Oum
NHS TDA	The Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust Chair	Chair	Sara Nathan	Jeremy Vanes

Department	Public body	Role	Public Appointments Assessor	Appointed Candidates
NHS TDA	St Helens & Knowsley Teaching Hospital NHS Trust	Chair	Sir Stephen Bubb	Richard Fraser
NHS TDA	North Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust	Chair	Margaret Scott	Gina Tiller
NHS TDA	Hull and East Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust	Chair	Sarah Anderson	Mike Ramsden
NHS TDA	United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust	Chair	Libby Watkins	Ron Buchanan
NHS TDA	Whittington Health NHS Trust	Chair	Sir Stephen Bubb	Steve Hitchins
NHS TDA	West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust	Chair	Sir Stephen Bubb	Mahdi Hasan
NIO	Human Rights Commission of Northern Ireland	Chair	Sarah Anderson	Les Allamby
SG	Police Negotiating Board	Chair	Mark Addison	John Randall
WG	All Wales Medicines Strategy Group	Chair	Rosie Varley	Dr Stuart Linton
WG	Powys Teaching Health Board	Chair	Sir Peter Spencer	Vivienne Harpwood
WG	Qualification Wales	Chair	Sir Peter Spencer	Elizabeth Ann Evan
WG	Hywel Dda Health Board	Chair	Michael Kaltz	Bernardine Rees
WG	Welsh Industrial Development Advisory Board	Chair	Sir Stephen Bubb	Kerry Diamond
AG DEPT	HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate	Chief Inspector	Margaret Scott	Kevin McGinty

Department	Public body	Role	Public Appointments Assessor	Appointed Candidates
HO	Technical Advisory Board	Chair	Amerdeep Somal	Jonathan Hoyle
FCO	Great Britain China Centre	Chair	Sir Peter Spencer	Martin Davidson
HO	UK Visas and Immigration	Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration	Margaret Scott	David Bolt
HMRC	HMRC	Non-Executive Directors	Rosie Varley	Mervyn Walker and Simon Ricketts
DfE	Children's Commission	Children Commissioner	Olivia Grant	Anne Longfield

Annex C: Exemptions granted in 2014-15

Department	Public Body	Exemption
BIS	Student Loans Company	Two interim assessors appointed to deal with unexpectedly high workload
BIS	Student Loans Company	Appointment of three non-executive members pending recruitment of permanent successors
CO	Senior Salaries Review Body	Appointment of Interim chair pending recruitment of permanent successor
DCLG	Housing Ombudsman	Appointment of Interim chair pending recruitment of permanent successor
DEFRA	Independent Agricultural Appeals Panel	Extension of tenure for members of the panel to allow the retention of vital skills, at a time of transition from the Single Payment Scheme to the Basic Payment Scheme
DEFRA	Internal Drainage Board	General exemption allowing all IDB appointments to be exempt as they are to be removed from OCPA's remit.
DEFRA	Science Advisory Panel	Appointment of Interim chair pending recruitment of permanent successor
DWP	Pensions Ombudsman	Temporary cover for Deputy Ombudsman
DWP	Independent Living Fund	Extension of tenure of Chair, Vice-Chair and Treasurer pending abolition of the body
FCO	Great Britain China Centre	Extension of tenure of current chair pending recruitment of permanent successor
HO	Technical Advisory Board	Extension of tenure of current chair pending recruitment of permanent successor
HO	HM Inspector of Constabulary	Short term emergency appointment to role of HM Inspector
MOD	Advisory Committee on Conscientious objectors	Extension of tenure of three members to enable body to be quorate pending a competition to appoint new lay members
MOJ	HM Chief Inspector of Probation	Appointment of Interim Chief Inspector following the resignation of current Chief Inspector
MOJ	The Advisory Panel on Public Sector Information	Extension of chair's tenure pending abolition of body
NHS TDA	St George's Healthcare NHS Trust	Extension to allow the body to retain much needed, unique skills during its audit

Department	Public Body	Exemption
NHS TDA	Manchester Mental Health & Social Care NHS Trust	Extension of chair's tenure to allow a long term strategy for the body to be developed
NHS TDA	Norfolk Community Health & Care NHS Trust	Exemption to allow a non-voting member of the Trust, recruited on merit following fair and open competition at a time when the law did not allow clinicians to be Non Exec members of Trust Boards, to fill a vacancy on the Board following a change in the law that removed the previous restriction on clinicians
NHS TDA	NHS Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and Community Trusts	Exemption to allow appointees who joined PCT committees under fair and open competition to be rolled over to be members of the new Community Trusts that replaced those bodies without a further competition
NHS TDA	Royal Cornwall Hospital NHS Trust	Further six months to original interim appointment agreed in order to allow chair to oversee recruitment of new Chief Executive
NHS TDA	Royal Liverpool & Broadgreen University Hospital NHS Trust	Urgent requirement for a new Chair that prevented a competition being run
NHS TDA	Hinchingbrooke Hospital NHS Trust	Urgent requirement for a new chair to remain operational.
National Offender Management Service	Probation Trust Residuary Board	Appointment of five board members made pending dissolution of probation trusts



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Public Appointments**

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