



The Commissioner for Public Appointments

Annual Report

2022|23

At a glance

OCA in numbers

337

public bodies regulated

130

significant appointments
regulated

624

appointments in 2022-23

576

reappointments in 2022-23

96

consultations or notifications
of the Commissioner

53.1%

of public appointments made
to female candidates

6.7%

of public appointments and
reappointments made to LGB+
candidates

74.4%

of female candidates who
were found appointable for
chair roles were subsequently
appointed

5.3%

fewer appointees and
reappointees based in London
and the South East

2

chairs appointed under the age
of 35, compared to 0 last year

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Commissioner's Foreword

A year ago, in the Foreword to the Annual Report of 2021-22, I asked a simple question: why should people care who is appointed to public positions and how? The answer is simple. Public bodies affect almost every aspect of civic life – cultural, ethical, medical, judicial, commercial. All these organisations are designed to help when people suffer ill health or legal difficulties, when they seek assurance of their personal and financial security, of the safety of their food, of the fairness of their wages and pensions. These bodies are supposed to help ensure that children receive good educations and that communities are protected from flooding and from disasters of other kinds. They must confirm that prisoners are treated with fairness and humanity. They urge and nurture innovation, providing the resources for increased productivity and future growth. The general public encounters the work of these bodies in museums and galleries, cinemas and theatres, libraries and national parks, sports stadia and ancient palaces, as well as in hospitals, schools, courtrooms and prisons.

In my role as Commissioner for Public Appointments, I am struck as much by the variety of these regulated bodies as by their clear importance. It is right that the diverse functions of these public bodies are matched by the diversity of those who lead them. This must be diversity in its broadest, truest sense – diversity of birth and background, of race and creed, of thought and experience.

These vital, varied institutions must be governed in the right way – with Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty and Leadership. These principles were articulated by the Committee on Standards in Public Life and its chair, Lord Nolan, in 1995; the same committee recommended the creation of the role of Commissioner. The 'Nolan Principles' have been adopted by institutions across this country and in others. They represent the very best of public service. Those who seek to

lead our public bodies should seek, first, to embody these values.

The picture presented by this Annual Report is in many ways reassuring. More than a thousand public appointments and reappointments were made in 2022-23. The vast majority of these followed open competition, fair evaluation of candidates and appointment on the basis of merit.

In a few cases, it was not possible to conduct a campaign of this kind – when an office-holder suddenly departed, for example, or a replacement was delayed. In such circumstances, the Governance Code on Public Appointments guides how ministers should act. I provide independent assurance that any proposed appointments are made in accordance with the Code and with the Principles of Public Appointments. Fortunately, deviations from the Code remain small in number: there were just four breaches in 2022-23, the lowest number since 2018-19. Overall, the public appointments system works well.

However, there are still ways in which processes can be improved. The most pernicious issue is the timeliness of public appointment campaigns. The ambition of the Governance Code is that campaigns should conclude within three months of a competition closing. Alas, the proportion of campaigns fulfilling this ambition fell again this year. The chief reason was the unusual ministerial churn in 2022-23. Ministers are responsible for these appointments and changes in ministers cause delays. As we now enjoy a period of greater continuity, with ministers remaining longer in their posts, I hope timeliness will improve.

In the meantime, having spoken to departments and gathered the necessary data, my team and I will pursue five main improvements. We plan to engage on these issues in the months following publication of

this report and, with the help of departmental teams, to try to set things right.

The first issue grows from the inquiry into the 2020-21 competition to appoint a new Chair of the BBC Board. The annual audit shows that departments are aware of the recommendations included as a part of the inquiry report. It is less clear, though, what practical action they are taking in response to those recommendations that might prevent a recurrence. I will engage with departments to explore such actions in more detail.

The annual audit illuminated a second issue. The departments that performed best across all aspects of public appointments were those with specialist central teams. This reinforces the guidance of the Governance Code, which recommends that ‘a specific central team or unit should be established so expertise is retained and capacity built in one place’. Departments without central teams had greater difficulties complying with the Code. I will be meeting again with Permanent Secretaries and will emphasise to them, where necessary, that public appointments teams should be seen as vital to the delivery of departmental objectives.

I am concerned, third, that some departments reported unusually high numbers of both appointments made without a full competition and exceptional reappointments (or extensions to tenure). I have already engaged with these departments and I will continued to do so. I wish to hear more about departmental recruitment practices and the ways in which departments can seek and find a greater number of excellent applicants.

A fourth issue is the apparent reuse, in some departments, of the same Senior Independent Panel Members (SIPMs) in multiple campaigns. SIPMs should act as additional guarantors of fairness and propriety. They are required to be independent of the appointing department, the public body and all political parties. It is essential, therefore, that a department does not come to rely on the same small group of people to fulfil this

important role. I will continue pressing departments to use as broad a range of SIPMs as possible.

The fifth and final issue is the procedure to register complaints. It is my job to consider complaints made about the public appointments process. I am surprised by the relatively small number of complaints that are made. I am concerned that an even smaller number are within my remit. I fear that either my role in considering complaints is insufficiently understood or the means to contact me is too complicated – or both. I will work to highlight the complaints procedure among applicants, ensuring that any dissatisfaction with the process is both voiced and heard.

None of these concerns, though, should detract substantially from the principal conclusion of this report: the public appointments system continues to work well. The system directs skilled, experienced people towards the right public bodies and uses their skills and experience in service of the public good. The watchword of this system must always be ‘merit’.

I am grateful to all these public appointees. I am grateful also for these public bodies themselves.

William Shawcross CVO
Commissioner for Public Appointments

The Principles of Public Appointments

Ministerial Responsibility

Ultimate responsibility for appointments and thus the selection of those appointed rests with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions and actions. Welsh Ministers are accountable to the National Assembly for Wales [Senedd Cymru].

Selflessness

Ministers when making appointments should act solely in terms of the public interest.

Integrity

Ministers when making appointments must avoid placing themselves under any obligation to people or organisations that might try inappropriately to influence them in their work.

They should not act or take decisions in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends.

They must declare and resolve any interests and relationships.

Merit

All public appointments should be governed by the principle of appointment on merit. This means providing Ministers with a choice of high quality candidates, drawn from a strong, diverse field, whose skills, experiences and qualities have been judged to meet the needs of the public body or statutory office in question.

Openness

Processes for making public appointments should be open and transparent.

Diversity

Public appointments should reflect the diversity of the society in which we live and appointments should be made taking account of the need to appoint boards which include a balance of skills and backgrounds.

Assurance

There should be established assurance processes with appropriate checks and balances. The Commissioner for Public Appointments has an important role in providing independent assurance that public appointments are made in accordance with these Principles and this Governance Code.

Fairness

Selection processes should be fair, impartial and each candidate must be assessed against the same criteria for the role.

Introduction

The role of the Commissioner

The office of Commissioner for Public Appointments was established in November 1995 on the recommendation of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Nolan. This committee first set out the Seven Principles of Public Life: Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty and Leadership. The fourth chapter of the Committee's first report, published in 1995, addressed 'Quangos'. It addressed, in particular, concerns that appointments were being unduly influenced by party political considerations.¹

The committee made four main recommendations (see **Box 1**). The report outlined a system in which appointment processes were clear, job specifications were widely circulated, candidates were drawn from a range of backgrounds and selection was made on the basis of merit and under the responsibility of ministers. This system would be overseen by a new 'public appointments commissioner', to whom departures from the system would have to be justified.

The Commissioner is appointed following an open competition. He is independent of both the government and the Civil Service and is officially appointed by the King. His powers are detailed in an Order in Council, a type of legislation made in the name and presence of

Box 1: Lord Nolan's four principal conclusions on public appointments

Appointments to the boards of executive NDPBs [Non-Departmental Public Bodies] and NHS bodies should be made on the basis of merit, to form boards with a balance of relevant skills and backgrounds.

Responsibility for appointments should remain with Ministers, advised by committees which include independent members.

A public appointments commissioner should be appointed, to regulate, monitor and report on the public appointments process.

The process should be open and departments should have to justify any departures from best practice. Job specifications should be published, and a wide range of candidates should be sought. The suitability of each candidate should be assessed by an advisory committee.

First Report, p. 65.

the monarch, by and with the advice and consent of the Privy Council.² The Public Appointments Order in Council makes provision for an independent Commissioner to monitor the procedures adopted by appointing authorities when making appointments to public bodies. The Order's first two articles set out when it comes into effect and how it should be interpreted; its third makes provision for a Governance Code (on which, see below); and the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh describe the functions, powers and duties of the Commissioner and how they should be exercised.

Most notably, perhaps, the Order includes two 'schedules'. Schedule 1 lists the bodies

¹ 'Chapter 4: Quangos (Executive NDPBs & NHS bodies)', *Standards in Public Life: First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life* (1995), pp. 65-96; hereafter *First Report*. Appointments are addressed in particular in pp. 68-82. Among these 'quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations' then were executive non-departmental public bodies and NHS bodies, now joined by arm's length bodies and executive agencies.

² The first Public Appointments Order in Council was made at Privy Council on 23 November 1995. It has successively been updated 24 times. The most recent of these updates were made on [13 July 2016](#) (though it did not come into effect until 1 January 2017, to coincide with the introduction of the Governance Code), [15 November 2017](#), [10 April 2019](#), [6 November 2019](#), [19 July 2023](#) and [15 November 2023](#).

and offices regulated by the Commissioner.³ Schedule 2 lists the specified employee posts which are to be public appointments, all Executive Chairs of major research bodies.⁴

The Order's third article makes provision for a Governance Code as follows:

The Minister for the Cabinet Office must prepare, publish and keep under review a Governance Code which sets out –
(a) the principles of public appointments, and
(b) guidance on the practices to be followed in relation to making public appointments.

The Governance Code on Public Appointments was published in 2016. Appointments had previously been governed by a Code of Practice, prescribed and published by the Commissioner, 'on the interpretation and application by appointing authorities of the principle of selection on merit'.⁵ This changed following the publication of *Better Public Appointments* (2016), a review of processes led by Sir Gerry Grimstone (later Lord Grimstone). Since 2017, the description and the assurance of best practice – two of Lord Nolan's central recommendations, previously conjoined in the role of the Commissioner – have been separate.

The Governance Code is published by the Minister for the Cabinet Office. The Code describes very clearly the role of ministers in the appointments process. It emphasises that before a competition opens ministers must be consulted to agree a job description, including remuneration and length of tenure; that they

should agree processes of advertising and selection; that they must approve the use of recruitment consultants and accept the composition of Advisory Assessment Panels (AAPs); that they may suggest names of candidates to be approached, provide views to the AAPs at all stages of competition and meet the candidates before interview, after interview or both.

The Governance Code states that the Commissioner's primary role is 'to provide independent assurance that public appointments are made in accordance with the Principles of Public Appointments and this Code'. Ministers are required to consult him when they appoint a candidate to a role without competition, to notify him where they decide to extend the tenure of an appointee in a role beyond two terms or a total of ten years. He provides assurance that appointments without competition and exceptional extensions to tenure only happen in exceptional circumstances, and are not a routine practice, with the majority of roles filled through open, fair and merit-based processes.

Annual audit 2022-23

The Annual Report is central to OCPA's public accountability. To ensure it presents an accurate picture of public appointments, it is informed by a detailed audit of appointments processes in departments across government. The Order in Council mandates the audit:

The Commissioner must, in the manner the Commissioner thinks fit, carry out an audit of the procedures and practices followed

³ Most changes to the Order are to update Schedule 1. In the updated Order of 19 July 2023, for example, 30 bodies were added (including 17 Civil Service departmental boards) and 44 bodies received greater or lesser updates to their names or regulated positions. 270 public bodies remained the same.

⁴ Those nine bodies: the Arts and Humanities Research Council; the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council; the Economic and

Social Research Council; the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council; Innovate UK; the Medical Research Council; the Natural Environment Research Council; Research England; and the Science and Technology Facilities Council.

⁵ [Code of Practice for Ministerial Appointment to Public Bodies \(2009\)](#), p. 15. The language comes from the Order in Council then in force, as referred to in the updated [Code of Practice \(2012\)](#), p. i.

Functions of the Commissioner

4.

- (1) The Commissioner must exercise his or her functions under this Order with the object of ensuring that appointing authorities act in accordance with the Governance Code, including the principles of public appointments.*
- (2) The Commissioner must, in the manner the Commissioner thinks fit, carry out an audit of the procedures and practices followed by appointing authorities in making public appointments, including the interpretation and application by them of the Governance Code including the principles of public appointments.*
- (3) The Commissioner may conduct an investigation into any aspect of public appointments with the object of improving their quality.*
- (4) The Commissioner may conduct an inquiry into the procedures and practices followed by an appointing authority in relation to any public appointment whether in response to a complaint or otherwise.*
- (5) The Commissioner may require appointing authorities to publish specified summary information relating to public appointments.*
- (6) For the purposes of this article, appointing authorities must provide the Commissioner with any information the Commissioner reasonably requires.*

Additional functions

- 5.** *The Commissioner may, at the request of a Minister of the Crown, carry out such additional functions as may be agreed between the Minister and the Commissioner.*

*by appointing authorities in making public appointments.*⁶

The audit is a vital instrument in the Commissioner's work to provide assurance that public appointments are made in a fair and open manner. It allows departments to demonstrate their practices in executing appointment campaigns and their processes for managing those campaigns.⁷ It gives departments the opportunity to reflect on areas of particular strength and to consider areas of relative weakness. It provides an opportunity to share effective innovations between appointment teams and to learn from others.

There were this year some changes to the audit process. Each government department was asked a broader set of questions and was required to provide the Commissioner with a different set of information compared to previous years. This survey replaced a more forensic analysis of a narrower set of campaigns delivered by specific departments. There are certainly benefits to both approaches. The intention in making these changes was to bring the campaign data used to inform this report into line with other sources of data. In previous years, the audit data could be almost two years old at the point of publication; all of the information in this report relates to the financial year 2022-23.

The methodology of the Commissioner's audit process will be reviewed in detail after the publication of this annual report and this review will inform practices next year. It is expected that Cabinet Office's new digital 'Applicant Tracking System', which has recently been implemented to manage public appointments processes across government, will provide a more detailed snapshot of

processes at all stages of campaigns, further simplifying the process of conducting an audit and improving the timeliness and quality of data available to the Commissioner.

Changes in the structure of the audit sometimes met changes in the structure of government. It was necessary, for example, to commission responses from the Department for Business and Trade, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology – as well as from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, now dissolved, which previously held responsibility for many of these departments' public appointments.

These changes are reflected and reflected upon in this Annual Report. The Report, like the audit, is established in the Order in Council:

The Commissioner must publish an annual report on public appointments which must include—

- (a) information arising from the audit carried out under article 4(2), including information about non-compliance; and*
- (b) an account of any inquiry into the public appointment procedures and practices of appointing authorities.*⁸

This guidance on 'procedures and practices' is expanded in the Code:

*The Commissioner should publish an annual report reporting on the overall state of public appointments covered by the Order in Council. This should examine compliance with the Public Appointments Principles and this Code, should include statistical information on appointments and track progress on increasing diversity.*⁹

⁶ [Public Appointments \(No. 2\) Order in Council 2023](#), 4(2); hereafter Order. The Code makes two further references to the audit – confirming its purpose to provide data for the Annual Report and confirming, too, that departments should publish the necessary 'real-time' data on individual

appointments. [Governance Code on Public Appointments](#), 4.2 and 8.3; hereafter Code.

⁷ As in previous years, this report will use the word 'department' to include the Welsh Government.

⁸ Order, 6.

⁹ Code, 4.2.

The following three sections of the report follow these requirements closely. The first ('Compliance') considers the extent to which departments followed or departed from the Governance Code in 2022-23 and, where departures were necessary, how the Commissioner was engaged. The second ('Statistical Information') briefly sets out the numbers of appointees and reappointees in the reporting period. The third ('Diversity') presents an analysis of these appointees and reappointees in accordance with the Commissioner's role as an active advocate for diversity.

Compliance with the Governance Code

In providing assurance that public appointments are made on merit and in a fair and open manner, the Commissioner is consulted and notified about all selection processes mandated under the Governance Code.

Broadly, as the Commissioner said before the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, the public appointments system continues to function well and according to the principles set out in the Governance Code.¹⁰ Some appointments, though, raise serious issues and those appointments attract a significant quantity of attention and damage public trust. There are, then, improvements to be made.

The audit revealed inconsistencies in the methods by which different departments manage their public appointments. The best results – closest compliance, most sensitive customer care – were delivered by those departments with a central team to manage these appointments. This is the system recommended in the Governance Code, a

'specific central team or unit' allowing expertise to be retained and capacity built in one place.¹¹ Two departments that lacked central teams during the reporting period were HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office – the latter of which was able to provide little of the data requested during the annual audit. This was a concern. However, both departments are currently building central public appointments teams, as recommended in the Code. The Cabinet Office reports that they have appointed a team leader and that a full team should be in place early in the new year. The Commissioner is aware that Cabinet Office ministers have been actively engaged in resolving this issue and he welcomes these developments.

Of greatest concern this year, as in 2021-22, is the timeliness of public appointments. The Governance Code sets out an ideal time period in which appointments be made: 'the aim should always be to conclude the process within three months of a competition closing'.¹² Departments reported that 322 campaigns were run in 2022-23. Of these, they reported that just 52 (or 16%) concluded within the three-month aim. These delays can cause the loss of excellent candidates, who may withdraw from elongated processes or may be discouraged from applying.¹³

The proportion of campaigns meeting the three-month aim was already low last year, at 25%. For it to fall further is striking. There are, of course, reasonable explanations for the fall. Departments report that the greatest delays come during engagement with ministers. These delays may be compounded during periods of ministerial change and 2022-23 was a period of unusually frequent ministerial change. Sadly, the Commissioner's comment in last year's Annual Report remains true: candidates and public bodies deserve better.

¹⁰ Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC), ['Oral evidence: the Work of the Commissioner for Public Appointments \(HC 1577\)'](#) (4 July 2023), Q3.

¹¹ Code, 7.2.

¹² Code, 7.8.

¹³ For this reason, the Commissioner described such delays as 'debilitating' when appearing before PACAC. PACAC, ['Oral evidence: the Work of the Commissioner for Public Appointments \(HC 1577\)'](#) (4 July 2023), Q2.

Figure 1: Section 3.3 consultations of the Commissioner, by department 2022-23




Figure 2: Section 3.3 consultations of the Commissioner, by reason, 2022-23





Figure 3: Section 3.6 consultations of the Commissioner, by department, 2022-23



Consultations and notifications

The Commissioner was consulted or notified by ministers 96 times in 2022-23. These included:

- 42 consultations on ministerial decisions, under section 3.3 of the Governance Code, to make appointments without fair and open competition (**Figure 1** and **Figure 2**);
- 30 notifications of decisions by ministers, under section 3.6 of the Governance Code, to extend the tenure of public appointees beyond either two terms or a total of ten years (**Figure 3**);
- 20 agreed consultations on the appointment of Senior Independent Panel Members for campaigns for significant appointments, under section 6.2 of the Governance Code;
- Four consultations, under section 2(4) of the Order in Council, about treating new public appointments as though they were regulated.

The Commissioner was not consulted or notified about ministers delegating responsibility for making appointments to any other body or person, under section 3.1 of the Governance Code. No minister chose to appoint a candidate deemed unappointable by an AAP; the Commissioner therefore received no consultations under section 3.2 of the Governance Code. A full list of ministerial consultations and notifications of the Commissioner is set out in **Appendix 2**.

The number of consultations and notifications is broadly in line with the overall figures for previous years, with the Commissioner having been consulted or notified 91 times in 2021-22 and 120 times in 2020-21. The Commissioner was content that each individual consultation or notification was made only in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances included, most frequently, the necessity of covering an unplanned vacancy for a short period of time and the continued need for a sitting chair's specific skills and

experience for overall organisational effectiveness.

The Commissioner is concerned, though, at the frequency with which these 'last resort' options are used in some departments. For instance, in 2022-23, the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs made seven appointments without a competition; in the same period they made nine exceptional reappointments or extensions to tenure. There are reasonable explanations for this: six of those seven candidates appointed without competition were reserves identified during a previous recruitment campaign; many of these posts require specialist technical expertise; some are also regionally specific, further shrinking pools of potential applicants. The Commissioner wants to engage with departments to understand how these campaigns are run at the moment and how they might be run more effectively. He emphasises, more generally, that exceptional appointments and extensions must continue to be the exception, never the rule.

Overall, appointments without competition and exceptional extensions to tenure form a tiny proportion of the total appointments and reappointments made each year. The number of public appointments and reappointments in 2022-23 was more than a thousand; the number of appointments without competition or exceptional extensions was less than a hundred. These figures support a belief that such measures are only being used where there is no alternative and certainly not as a means of circumventing the need for open, fair and merit-based appointments.

The same is true for the public appointment system more generally. Though there are issues with a small number of appointments, the Commissioner is confident that the system as a whole continues to function well.

Senior Independent Panel Members

The Commissioner also agrees with ministers a list of 'significant appointments',

recruitment processes for which require additional assurance. This additional assurance is provided by the presence of Senior Independent Panel Members (SIPMs) on the Advisory Assessment Panels of these campaigns. The minister with departmental responsibility for a given competition should agree to the SIPM, consulting the Commissioner before the competition begins. Departments should conduct thorough due diligence on the SIPM. The SIPM should be independent of the department and of the body concerned and should not be currently politically active.¹⁴ The role of the SIPM is to provide assurance that appointments processes comply with the Governance Code and the Principles of Public Appointments.

In 2022-23, the Commissioner was consulted about the appointment of 20 SIPMs across 11 departments. The highest number (five) came from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). DCMS were responsible for a large number of significant appointments to museum bodies, for example, as well as to the boards of the Heritage Lottery Fund and the BBC. In 2022-23, the five competitions it ran for significant appointments were for the chairs of the boards of Historic England, Historic Royal Palaces, the Museum of the Home, the National Citizen Service and VisitBritain (the British Tourist Authority). The department consulted the Commissioner on the appointment of a different SIPM for each of these campaigns.

It is good practice for a different person to serve as SIPM on each campaign a department runs, ensuring that SIPMs retain their independence from the given department. This practice was followed by almost every department in 2022-23: 10 departments reported running, between them, 17 campaigns for significant

appointments and in these campaigns used 17 different SIPMs.

The sole exception was the Welsh Government, who in their audit return reported using three SIPMs for seven campaigns in 2022-23. Though the Commissioner was content with the choice of SIPM for each campaign individually, the pattern as a whole raises concerns. Officials explain that they have an additional obligation: campaigns for some of their significant appointments require a fluent Welsh speaker. The figures suggest that the Welsh Government needs to expand its pool of potential SIPMs and needs to recruit into that pool a larger number of Welsh speakers.

Complaints

The number of complaints is noteworthy in that they relate to a relatively tiny proportion of the total number of appointments and reappointments made in 2022-23. As part of the annual audit, departments reported a total of nine complaints in the year.¹⁵ If the complainant is dissatisfied with the response he or she receives from the relevant appointing department, he or she may bring the complaint to the Commissioner. In 2022-23, the Commissioner received six such complaints. All were outside the scope of the Commissioner's powers, most often because they concerned the substance of an appointment decision rather than the process by which that decision was taken.

The question of the Commissioner's jurisdiction is an important one. The Order is clear that the Commissioner 'may conduct an inquiry into the procedures and practices followed by an appointing authority in relation to any public appointment whether in response to a complaint or otherwise'.¹⁶ This

¹⁴ Political activities are defined in five potential ways: being employed by a political party, holding significant office in a party, standing as a candidate for a party in an election, having publicly spoken on behalf of a political party or having made

significant donations or loans to a party. Code, 6.1, n. 4.

¹⁵ Of these, eight were made by applicants to competitions.

¹⁶ Order, 4(4). The Code is similarly clear.

means, in practice, that while the Commissioner may ensure that an authority followed the right steps in making a decision, he will not consider whether the decision made was correct or attempt to retake the decision on behalf of the authority. A complaint must relate to a deviation from proper process; if a complaint is that a decision is 'unfair', the unfairness must have a procedural element.

Breaches, inquiries and investigations

Regulated public appointments should be made after an appropriate competition is run according to the Principles of Public Appointments. Such competitions attract the most diverse field of candidates possible and judge those candidates fairly, allowing appointments to be made on the basis of merit.

In certain, exceptional circumstances, however, this may not be possible. An appointee may have to be replaced immediately, having resigned or for another reason become suddenly unavailable. The Governance Code sets out how, to maintain public trust, these appointments should be managed. The Commissioner takes deviations from the Code very seriously – identifying any deviations as breaches, investigating why they occurred and recommending changes where necessary to prevent reoccurrence.

Four breaches of the Code were identified in the reporting period between April 2022 and March 2023. Two of these were by the Welsh Government and one each were by the Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Department for Education (DfE).

Three of the four concerned the timetable for appointing Senior Independent Panel

Members (SIPMs). The Governance Code states:

Ministers must agree who the SIPM should be for each competition and should consult the Commissioner for Public Appointments ahead of the process commencing. Sufficient time should be built in for the Commissioner to discuss with either or both of the Minister or SIPM before the competition goes live.¹⁷

In each of these three cases – two by the Welsh Government and one by BEIS – the competition was launched before the department had consulted the Commissioner on the appointment of the SIPM.¹⁸ Each of the three selections was otherwise compliant with the Governance Code, but the Commissioner stresses the need for care to avoid such breaches.

The fourth breach, which occurred in a competition run by DfE officials, concerned disclosure of political activity. The relevant section of the Code states that such activity

should not affect any judgement of merit nor be a bar to appointment or being a member of an Advisory Assessment Panel, with the exception of Senior Independent Panel Members. It should be publicly disclosed however if a panel member, or a successful candidate, has, in the last five years, been employed by a political party, held a significant office in a party, has stood as a candidate for a party in an election, has publicly spoken on behalf of a political party, or has made significant donations or loans to a party.¹⁹

The competition found in breach was for the Further Education Commissioner. One member of the Advisory Assessment Panel had declared political activity, as a Conservative member of the House of Lords;

¹⁷ Code, 6.2.

¹⁸ The relevant campaigns were for the Chair of the Low Pay Commission (run by BEIS) and the Chair of the Powys Teaching Health Board and the Future

Generations Commissioner (both run by the Welsh Government).

¹⁹ Code, 9.2.

however, this activity was not listed on the advertisement for the role. In a previous competition for a different role, the political activity of this panel member had been correctly listed. The Commissioner accepted the department's explanation, viewing the breach as an unfortunate oversight and expressing his confidence that DfE did not purposefully subvert the Code's transparency provisions.

Outside of these breaches, the Commissioner initiated three investigations in 2022-23. The first was commissioned to scrutinise a breach originally identified during the preparation of the Commissioner's Annual Report for 2021-22. The Cabinet Office consulted the Commissioner on a proposed SIPM in November 2021 and, based on the information provided by the department, the Commissioner declared himself content. However, the Cabinet Office did not disclose to OCPA the SIPM's political activity and, to the Commissioner's great regret, the activity was also overlooked during OCPA's checks. The SIPM had made two donations to political parties in the two years before the competition, both at reportable levels.²⁰ The Governance Code disallows SIPMs who are currently politically active and who, specifically, have made significant donations to a political party in the previous five years.²¹ OCPA ran a five-month internal investigation and reviewed the panel report of the competition interviews. The investigation found no reason to believe the competition was non-compliant in any other respect. However, at the conclusion of this investigation, the Commissioner engaged all the relevant stakeholders – including the SIPM, the appointee and the Cabinet Office – and made changes to OCPA's due diligence processes.

²⁰ In the period of this report, between April 2022 and March 2023, donations above £7,500 had to be reported.

²¹ Code, 6.1 and 9.2.

²² [‘Investigation of the ministerial appointment process relating to the chair of the National Lottery Community Fund, a public body of the](#)

The second investigation was into the appointment process for the Chair of the National Lottery Community Fund. A decision notice setting out the Commissioner's findings was published on the OCPA website in July 2022.²²

The third and final investigation was into the appointment process for the Chair of the BBC Board. The Commissioner delegated to the Chief Executive of OCPA his power to conduct the inquiry; the Chief Executive in turn appointed Adam Heppinstall KC. A decision notice setting out Mr Heppinstall's findings was published on the OCPA website in April 2023.²³

[Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport’, <publicappointmentscommissioner.independent.gov.uk>.](#)

²³ [‘Decision Notice: The Appointment of the Chair of the Board of the British Broadcasting Corporation \(BBC\) 2020/2021’, <publicappointmentscommissioner.independent.gov.uk>.](#)

Statistical information

General

Two of the three requirements of the Annual Report, set out in the Governance Code, as already noted, are statistical in nature. These two requirements are to ‘include statistical information on appointments’ and to ‘track progress on increasing diversity’.²⁴

OCA has two chief sources of such data – the annual audit, in which departments answer a number of questions asked by the Commissioner, and the Cabinet Office.²⁵ The Cabinet Office collect data from departments and then collate it in an annual manual process. It is then shared with OCA. All the data provided by departments (in both forms) is anonymised, with all candidate names removed. Where the two sets of data diverge, that provided by the Cabinet Office is used for consistency.

There were 624 public appointments and 576 reappointments made in 2022-23. The 624 appointments were made via 272 campaigns. Of these 272 campaigns, 242 provided candidate data from all four stages – from applications, from shortlisting, from being found appointable at interview and from appointments (**Figure 4**, overleaf). The Commissioner is concerned in particular with how candidates from different backgrounds and with different characteristics progress through campaigns. The figures quoted and analysed in the ‘Diversity’ section therefore focus on these 242 campaigns, if not otherwise stated.

The most obvious consequence of this is in the total number of appointees. There were 624 people appointed through campaigns within the scope of the Commissioner’s remit in 2022-23; there were 564 people appointed through campaigns which provided data at all

four stages of competition. This analysis therefore uses 564 as the total number of appointees.

²⁴ Code, 4.2.

²⁵ The ‘Diversity’ section uses a third source of data, from the 2021 census, for comparison. This

data is publicly available through the Office for National Statistics (ONS).

Figure 4: Number of successful campaigns with data at all four stages, by department, 2022-23





Figure 5: Appointments and reappointments made to ethnic minority candidates, 2013-23



Diversity

Diversity is one of the eight Principles of Public Appointments. As the Governance Code states,

Public appointments should reflect the diversity of the society in which we live and appointments should be made taking account of the need to appoint boards which include a balance of skills and backgrounds.²⁶

Moreover, the Code is plain that

To be truly effective public bodies must bring together a mix of people with different skills, experience and backgrounds to serve on their boards. It is therefore important that departments design and implement public appointments processes with diversity in mind.²⁷

Diversity reduces groupthink and, through visibly wider representation, improves public trust.

In his role as an advocate for diversity, the Commissioner receives and analyses departmental data showing annual cohorts of public appointees and their anonymised responses to diversity questions. This section sets out the analysis of that data in ten parts: ethnicity; disability; gender; age; sexual orientation; religion and belief; area of principal residence; principal employment; additional appointments; and political activity.

Some very encouraging stories emerge from the data. Public appointees in 2022-23 were drawn from a greater range of ages than last year – members declared themselves in every age category between 16-24 and 75-84. Having recorded no chairs under the age of 35 in 2021-22, there were two this year.

Though female candidates continued to apply in lower numbers than men, they also continued to be disproportionately successful at all stages of public appointment competitions. This was particularly pronounced at the later stages of campaigns: almost three-quarters (74.4%) of female candidates found to be appointable were subsequently appointed.

It was otherwise a similar year to last, with gains of 2021-22 consolidated in most categories of diversity.

Ethnicity

Of the 564 appointees to public roles, 437 (or 77.5%) stated their ethnicity.²⁸ Of the 576 reappointees, similarly, 416 (72.2%) stated their ethnicity.²⁹ Both figures represented slight decreases from last year (83%) and the year before (79%). The Commissioner is keen to emphasise to departments the importance of raising reporting rates – low rates damage data integrity and make it more difficult to monitor trends over time.

The proportion of appointments and reappointments made to those from minority ethnic backgrounds fell slightly in 2022-23 (**Figure 5**). Having grown from 9.6% in 2020-21 to 13.3% in 2021-22, the figure in 2022-23 was 12.7%. Though there was a small rise in the proportion of reappointees from ethnic minority backgrounds (from 9.2% last year to 11.1% this), there was a larger fall in the proportion of appointees from ethnic minority backgrounds (from 16.6% to 14.2%).

The proportion of applicants from ethnic minority backgrounds grew for a second year in a row, from 19.4% in 2020-21 to 20.3% in

²⁶ Code, 2.1.

²⁷ Code, 7.4.

²⁸ Of the 564 appointees, 527 answered a question about ethnicity; of these 527, 437 gave their ethnicity and 90 preferred not to say.

²⁹ Of the 576 reappointees, 501 answered a question about ethnicity; of these 501, 416 gave their ethnicity and 85 preferred not to say.

2021-22 and now to 20.4% in 2022-23 (**Figure 6**).

The ethnicity of applicants in 2022-23 was close to the most recent census data: in 2021, 81.7% of usual residents in England and Wales identified their ethnicity as 'White'.³⁰ The relatively high proportion of ethnic minority candidates at application stage is not, however, represented at later stages of competition. The proportion of ethnic minority candidates among those shortlisted was 15.1% in the reporting period; the equivalent figure was 11.6% among those found appointable at interview and 14.2% among those appointed. That each of these three figures represented a fall from 2021-22 is a fact worth monitoring.³¹

The same data allows investigation of candidates' differing chances of success at different stages of their applications (**Figure 7**). It shows that the greatest gap between the success of white candidates and of candidates from ethnic minority backgrounds came at shortlisting stage. A white candidate had a three-in-ten chance of being shortlisted (30.3%); a non-white candidate had a two-in-ten chance (21.0%).

On the other hand, at the final stage of a campaign – after interview, having been found appointable – the gap reverses. Appointable candidates from ethnic minority backgrounds were appointed 63.3% of the time. Appointable candidates not from ethnic minority backgrounds were appointed 59.8% of the time.

The story is similar for chair roles (**Figure 8**). Again, appointment rates among those candidates found appointable are slightly higher for those from ethnic minority

backgrounds – 58.3% of those found appointable are appointed, compared to 53.2% of candidates who did not describe themselves as coming from an ethnic minority background. For these chair roles, though, the gap is even larger between the proportions of applicants shortlisted. While four-in-ten non-minority applicants for chair posts were shortlisted (39.9%), the proportion among applicants from ethnic minority backgrounds was exactly a quarter (25.0%).

Finally, ethnic diversity among Welsh Government appointments fell quite steeply in 2022-23 – to 9.8%, from 12.7% of appointees in 2021-22.³²

Disability

Collection of data relating to disability continues to be complicated. The complication arises from the two different methods for asking about disability. Before January 2020, departments asked a one-stage disability question – simply, 'do you consider yourself to be disabled'? An answer of 'yes' would count the respondent as having a disability. Since January 2020, candidates in the majority of campaigns have instead been asked a two-stage question: first, 'do you have any physical or mental health conditions or illnesses lasting or expected to last 12 months or more'; second, 'if you have answered yes to the question above, does your condition or illness/ do any of your conditions or illnesses reduce your ability to carry out day-to-day activities'? As well as 'prefer not to say', there are three possible responses to this second question – 'no', 'yes, a little' and 'yes, a lot'.³³ A person was counted as having a disability if he or she

³⁰ ONS, '[Ethnic group, England and Wales: Census 2021](https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/ethnicity/census2021)' (29 November 2022), <ons.gov.uk>.

³¹ The equivalent figures for 2021-22: ethnic minority candidates made up 16.4% of shortlisted candidates, 15.1% of candidates found appointable and 16.6% of appointees.

³² Of the 63 total appointments made by Welsh Government ministers in 2022-23, 61 gave

information about their ethnicity; of those 61, who responded, six were from ethnic minority backgrounds.

³³ There is technically a fifth response to this question (as there is to most questions): not to answer it. Unless otherwise stated, this report treats not responding as synonymous with preferring not to say.

Figure 6: Ethnicity breakdown where declared, by competition stage, 2022-23




Figure 7: Success of applicants and interviewees by ethnic background, 2022-23




Figure 8: Success of applicants and those found appointable for chair roles, by ethnic background, 2022-23




Figure 9: Disability status of candidates (one-stage question), by competition stage, 2022-23




Figure 10: Disability status of candidates (two-stage question), by competition stage, 2022-23




Figure 11: Appointments and reappointments made to those declaring female, 2014-2023



answered 'yes' to the first question and either 'yes, a little' or 'yes, a lot' to the second.³⁴

The change to the question was based on guidance from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The two-stage question is designed to refer more closely to the legal definition in the Equality Act 2010.³⁵ Asking the two-stage question, the ONS in the 2021 census found that the proportion of disabled people in England and Wales was 17.8%.³⁶

A total of 39 campaigns reported asking the one-stage question in 2022-23; 205 reported asking the two-stage question. The proportion of campaigns using the two-stage question, then, represented an increase compared to last year.³⁷ The divide between reporting methods presents a difficulty when attempting to understand disability in public appointments. The one- and two-stage questions describe and measure disability differently. They resist combination.

The policy of this report, then, is to use both measures independent of one another. Data will be quoted from both one- and two-stage questions. The benefits of this approach are that candidate disability declarations are reported, regardless of questioning regime, and included in the overall picture of disability in public appointments.³⁸

Responses to both the one-stage question (**Figure 9**) and the two-stage question (**Figure 10**) suggest that the proportion of public appointments held by disabled people is well below the proportion of disabled people in

the population. Of those applicants who responded to the one-stage question, 12.3% declared a disability; 6.2% of applicants who responded to the two-stage question declared a disability. Both of these figures are significant rises from last year.³⁹

Analysis of the one-stage question suggests that candidates with disabilities progressed well through most stages of public recruitment competitions in 2022-23. Reasonably similar proportions of candidates declared a disability throughout: 12.3% at application, 13.1% at shortlisting, 10.7% after interview and 12.8% at appointment. The most significant difference was the fall in the proportion found appointable at interview.

Findings from the two-stage question are less affirming. The proportion of candidates declaring a disability in response to the two-stage question fell at all stages of competition: from 6.2% of those applying to 5.4% of those shortlisted to 5.2% of those found appointable and 4.9% of those appointed. In 2021-22, the two-stage question showed the opposite pattern, with the proportion of disabled candidates increasing at each stage of competition. The difference may simply be an artefact of the different competitions run in different years, but ought to be monitored carefully.

Gender

Response rates to questions about candidate gender continue to be strong, allowing a high

³⁴ This is the same method as OCPA's Annual Report for 2021-22. Respondents who preferred not to say or who answered only one question (or, indeed, neither question) are excluded from the data.

³⁵ The [Equality Act 2010](#) states that 'A person (P) has a disability if— (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities'. Determination of disability is considered at greater length in Schedule 1 of the Act.

³⁶ ONS, '[Disability, England and Wales: Census 2021](#)' (19 January 2023), <ons.gov.uk>.

³⁷ In 2021-22, 77.8% of campaigns asked the two-stage question; in 2022-23, 84.0%.

³⁸ The major drawback is obvious. Both measures are vulnerable to sorting: perhaps the kind of campaign that uses a one-stage question is significantly more or less likely, for whatever reason, to receive applications from people with disabilities. If this is the case, both one- and two-stage response data will be skewed.

³⁹ In 2021-22, 7.0% of applicants responding to the one-stage question and less than 5.0% of applicants responding to the two-stage question declared a disability.

level of confidence in the data. The response rate of appointees – of 93.0% – was even higher than last year, having risen by 10% the year before.⁴⁰ The equivalent figure among reappointees also increased compared to last year, from 76.3% to 86.8%.

This data shows an increasing proportion of public appointments held by women (**Figure 11**, p. 24). In 2022-23, 53.1% of public appointments were to those declaring themselves female.⁴¹ The proportion of female reappointments fell slightly, from 45.7% last year to 44.4% this.

Previous Annual Reports have noted the relatively low proportion of applications made by those declaring as female. In 2020-21 35.4% of applicants were female and the figure rose to 41.2% in 2021-22; this year it rose again, to 41.7% (**Figure 12**).

When female candidates do apply, they are more likely than their male counterparts to succeed at every stage of competition. Those 41.7% of applicants made up 44.9% of those shortlisted, 47.9% of those found appointable and, ultimately, 53.1% of appointments.

Last year, for the first time, half of chair appointments were awarded to those declaring female (**Figure 13**). This year there was a slight fall from that historic high, to 49.2%.

It is harder to know what to make of the sudden decrease in reappointments being made to female candidates. This figure had risen very consistently over the previous five years – from 28.0% in 2017-18 to 29.7% in 2018-19 to 35.3% in 2019-20 to 40.7% in 2020-21 to 51.0% in 2021-22. In 2022-23 it slumped to 28.6%. The fall can probably be attributed to an odd year and a small sample

size.⁴² For the proportion to suffer a fall of nearly half, though, is concerning.

It seems to be a trend limited to reappointments. Female candidates in new campaigns for new chairs are much more likely to experience success than their male counterparts (**Figure 14**). This trend was particularly pronounced after interview: 74.4% of candidates found appointable and declaring female were appointed in 2022-23; the equivalent figure for those declaring male was 42.9%.

Age

Reporting rates for the ages of appointees continued to increase in 2022-23: 92.6% of appointees revealed their ages, compared to 88% last year and 78% the year before.⁴³

There was an increase in the diversity of ages of those holding public appointments. Every member appointed in 2021-22 was between the ages of 16 and 74; in 2022-23, there were also members between the ages 75 and 84. The age range of chairs expanded in the opposite direction. In 2021-22 no chair appointed was under the age of 35; in 2022-23 there were two.

More generally, member and chair age distribution pyramids flattened in 2022-23 (**Figure 15**). In 2021-22, the largest proportions of both members and chairs were drawn from those aged between 55 and 64. This was true again in 2022-23, but to a lesser extent – from 38.0% to 34.7% of members, from 56.0% to 40.6% of chairs.

Larger proportions of chairs were drawn in 2022-23 from those in the age categories 25 to 34 (as mentioned), 35 to 44 and 65 to 74.

⁴⁰ The response rate in 2021-22 was 91.6%; the year before it was 81.5%.

⁴¹ The five appointed respondents who preferred not to state their gender are excluded from these figures. All reappointment respondents stated their gender as either 'male' or 'female'; none preferred not to say.

⁴² In 2022-23, 36 Chairs were reappointed. Of these 35 provided data about gender: 10 were female; 25 were male.

⁴³ Of the 564 appointees, 522 provided data about their ages. A further 7 responded to the question, but preferred not to say.

Figure 12: Gender breakdown, by stage of competition, 2022-23




Figure 13: Chair appointments and reappointments made to those declaring female, 2013-2023




Figure 14: Success of applicants and interviewees for chair roles (male and female declarations only), 2022-23




Figure 15: Appointments of members and chair, by age, proportions, 2022-23




Figure 16: Appointments and reappointments, by sexual orientation, 2022-23




Figure 17: Appointees and reappointees, by religion or belief, 2022-23





Figure 18: Region of principal residence for appointees and reappointees, HM Government only, 2022-23



The most remarkable rise was in those aged between 35 and 44: in 2021-22, less than 5% of appointees to chair roles placed themselves in this age category; in 2022-23, that figure had risen to 9.4%.

Sexual orientation

Reporting rates for sexual orientation data continued to be steady. A combined 79.6% of appointees and reappointees provided information about their sexual orientation; a further 7.5% responded to the question but preferred not to say.

The proportion of people declaring an LGB+ sexuality either appointed or reappointed remained exactly the same: 6.7% of successful candidates declared themselves LGB+ in 2022-23, as in 2021-22, maintaining the rise from 5.0% in 2020-21 (**Figure 16**). This is a greater proportion than in the public at large: in the 2021 census, 3.2% of people described themselves as LGB+. ⁴⁴

Religion and belief

Of people either appointed or reappointed to public boards and bodies in 2022-23, 81.5% provided information about their religion or beliefs; a further 8.8% responded to the question but preferred not to say.

Christianity was – as in 2021-22 – the stated religion of the majority of appointees and reappointees (55.2%), followed again by those declaring no religion or atheist views (35.2%; **Figure 17**). Small minorities of appointees and reappointees declared themselves Muslim (2.2%), Jewish (1.8%), Sikh (1.5%), Hindu (1.4%) and Buddhist (0.6%). Christians, who according to the most recent census made up 46.2% of the population, are over-

represented; Muslims, who made up 6.5% of the population, are under-represented. ⁴⁵

Area of principal residence

The Commissioner is keen that diversity in public appointments be considered in its broadest sense. This emphasis on breadth echoes the Governance Code on Public Appointments. In a footnote to the Code's statement (already quoted) on the importance of diversity to the effective running of public bodies, it is added that diversity should 'go beyond gender, disability or race, to include wider characteristics such as sexual orientation, gender identity and social background'. ⁴⁶ In other words, diversity in public appointments considers both those characteristics protected under the Equality Act 2010 and also characteristics not covered by that Act.

One facet of this broader understanding is the region from which public appointees are drawn. All applicants to regulated public bodies are asked the region of their principal residence. For the purposes of answering, England is divided into North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands, West Midlands, East, London, South East and South West. Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are not further subdivided. ⁴⁷ The figures are skewed by division of appointing authority between the UK and Welsh governments, as well as by the separate regulatory regimes in Scotland and Northern Ireland. **Figure 18**, then, shows only appointments made by UK Government Ministers.

Response rates were very high: 88.9% of appointees or reappointees provided information in response to a question on their

⁴⁴ In the census, LGB+ includes the categories Gay or lesbian (1.54%), Bisexual (1.28%), Pansexual (0.10%), Asexual (0.06%), Queer (0.03%) and All other sexual orientations (0.15%). ONS, '[Sexual orientation, England and Wales: Census 2021](#)' (6 January 2023).

⁴⁵ Those declaring no religion are accurately represented: they made up 37.2% of the population in the census. ONS, '[Religion, England and Wales: Census 2021](#)' (29 November 2022).

⁴⁶ Code, 7.4, n. 6.

⁴⁷ 'Other' is also an option.

area of principle residence; just 1.3% preferred not to say.

Candidates based in London and the South East continued to dominate public appointments. In 2021-22, these two regions combined accounted for 42.7% of appointees and reappointees; in 2022-23, the figure was 37.4%. As well as this slight reduction, though, there was a shift in emphasis, with the South East increasing its share of appointees (from 16.6% to 21.3%) to overtake London as the most popular single region. London's share fell by exactly 10%, from 26.1% to 16.1%.

There was otherwise relatively little change from last year. One noteworthy difference was an increase in the share of public appointments won by candidates based in Yorkshire and Humberside, which increased from 4.1% to 6.3%. There was also a significant expansion in the proportion of Wales-based appointees, rising from 2.6% in 2021-22 to 8.4% in 2022-23.

Principal employment

The Commissioner is also enthusiastic about attracting candidates from a variety of professional backgrounds, people who will be able to bring to public appointments skills that might otherwise be lacking. To track this, applicants are asked to state in outline their employment history. Answers are divided into six categories: mostly Civil Service, mostly Private Sector, mostly Third Sector, mostly wider Public Sector, mixed and other.

The picture is largely similar to that of 2021-22, with public appointees drawn from a variety of professional backgrounds (**Figure 19**). Slight falls in the proportions from the Private Sector (from 31.3% to 29.2%), mixed careers (from 21.1% to 18.1%) and the wider Public Sector (from 32.6% to 32.2%) are matched with slight rises in the proportions from the Civil Service (from 4.6% to 6.2%) and the Third Sector (from 5.7% to 8.6%), as well as other professions (from 4.8% to 5.7%).

Additional appointments

There is a balance to be struck between attracting new candidates and appointing those with previous experience in public appointments. Consequently, applicants are asked whether or not they hold any other public appointments – and, if so, how many other public appointments they hold. The balance in 2022-23 tilted in the direction of new candidates. This was true among appointees to both chair and membership roles: 58.7% of chairs and 71.7% of members held no other public appointments; the equivalent figures for 2021-22 were 43.4% and 67.2% (**Figure 20**).

Political activity

The Governance Code makes clear that political activity is not a barrier either to appointment or to sitting on an Advisory Assessment Panel. The sole exception is the role of SIPM, which must be performed by a person who is not politically active. However, the political activity of any successful candidate must be publicly disclosed. To this end, a two-stage question is asked of all appointees and reappointees: first, whether they have undertaken any significant political activity; second, if they answer affirmatively, for which party it was undertaken. Declared political activity remains rare among holders of public appointments (**Figure 21** and **Figure 22**). Just 3.0% of appointees or reappointees – a total of 29 candidates – declared political activity. Of these, the same proportion (42.5) had undertaken political activity for the Conservative as had done so for Labour; others declared political activity on behalf of the Liberal Democrats.

Figure 19: Previous work experience of all new appointees (chairs and members), 2022-23




Figure 20: Additional appointments held by appointees, by role, 2022-23




Figure 21: Proportion of appointees and reappointees declaring significant political activity, 2022-23




Figure 22: Political party affiliation of those appointees and reappointees declaring significant political activity, 2022-23

Appendices

Appendix 1: OCPA financial information

In order to deliver his responsibilities, the Commissioner is supported by a small number of civil servants who are on secondment from the Cabinet Office to the independent Civil Service Commission (CSC) secretariat. The budget and expenditure of OCPA, as well as those of ACOBA, are incorporated within the Commission's overall budget and expenditure.

The honorarium paid to the Commissioner and the salaries of his staff comprise the vast majority of OCPA's direct costs, with small additional sums being spent on travel and subsistence so that the Commissioner can support engagement and outreach events held across the UK.

In 2022-23, the Office's net expenditure was £286,000, of which £63,000 was Commissioner fees.⁴⁸ This represented a rise of 17% from 2021-22, when the equivalent figure was £245,000.⁴⁹

Appendix 2: full list of consultations and notifications

Article 2(4) cases: newly regulated bodies

Where a provisional appointment is to be made before a public body or public office exists in law or before a body or office has been specified as a public body or public office for the purposes of the Order in Council, the Minister for the Cabinet Office may notify the Commissioner that the appointment is to be treated as if it were a public appointment to a public body or public office for the purposes of this Order.

1. The Chair of the Future Systems Operator became a regulated,

significant appointment on 18 January 2023.

2. The Health Safety Services Investigation Board was added to the list of regulated bodies, with the Chair role becoming a significant appointment on 20 April 2022.
3. The Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigation Special Health Authority was added to the list of regulated bodies on 8 November 2022.
4. The Service Police Complaints Commissioner became a regulated, significant appointment on 20 April 2022.

Section 3.1 cases: delegations

Ministers may, where they have the power to do so, choose to delegate responsibility for certain appointments to the appropriate body in question to run and make appointments. This should be agreed with the Cabinet Office and the Commissioner for Public Appointments, along with any exemptions from this Code as necessary.

None in 2022-23.

Section 3.2 cases: unappointable candidates

Ministers should consider the advice of Advisory Assessment Panels but are not bound by their views. Ministers may therefore reject a panel's advice on the merit of candidates and choose to re-run a competition with a new panel. Ministers may choose to appoint someone who is not deemed 'appointable' by the Advisory Assessment Panel. In this case, they must consult the Commissioner for Public Appointments in good time before a public announcement and will be required to justify their decision publicly.

None in 2022-23.

⁴⁸ This amounts to 12% of the CSC's budget of £2.43mn.

⁴⁹ This amounted to 11% of the CSC's 2021-22 budget of £2.18mn.

Section 3.3: direct appointments

In exceptional cases, Ministers may decide to appoint a candidate without a competition. They must make this decision public alongside their reasons for doing so. They must consult the Commissioner for Public Appointments in good time before the appointment is publicly announced.

Department	Body	Role(s)	Length	Rationale
BEIS	Post Office	1 Chair	Two months	Planned Recruitment
Cabinet Office	Senior Salaries Review Board	1 Chair	12 months	Planned Recruitment
Cabinet Office	Senior Salaries Review Board	1 Member	10 months	Planned Recruitment
Cabinet Office	Civil Services Pensions Board	1 Chair	Three months	Planned Recruitment
DCMS	Museum of the Home	1 Chair	Two months	Planned Recruitment
DCMS	Museum of the Home	1 Chair	Six weeks	Planned Recruitment
DCMS	Historic Royal Palaces	1 Chair	12 months	Planned Recruitment
DCMS	British Tourist Authority	1 Chair	Three months	Planned Recruitment
DCMS	Visit England Advisory Board	1 Chair	Nine months	Planned Recruitment
DCMS	Gambling Commission	1 Chair	Nine months	Unplanned Vacancy
Defra	Covent Garden Market Authority	1 Chair	12 months	Unplanned Vacancy
DfE	Social Work England	1 Chair	12 months	Unplanned Vacancy
DfT	West Mids Traffic Commissioner	1 Office Holder	12 months	Unplanned Vacancy
DHSC	NHS Resolution	1 Chair	Three months	Unplanned Vacancy
DHSC	NHS Resolution	1 Chair	2.5 months	Unplanned Vacancy
DHSC	NHS England	1 Member	16 months	New Public Body
DHSC	NHS England	1 Member	Eight months	New Public Body
DHSC	Health Education England	1 Member	12 months	Body Being Disestablished
NHSIE	Croydon NHS Trust	1 Member	12 months	Specific Expertise
NHSIE	Notts University NHS Trust	1 Chair	12 months	Unplanned Vacancy
NHSIE	West London NHS Trust	1 Member	Two years	Unplanned Vacancy

Department	Body	Role(s)	Length	Rationale
DLUHC	Regulator of Social Housing	1 Member	12 months	To Ensure Continuity
DLUHC	Building Regs Advisory Cttee	1 Member	19 months	Body Being Disestablished
DLUHC	Valuation Tribunal Service	1 Member	12 months	Planned Recruitment
DWP	Pensions Ombudsman	1 Office Holder	12 months	To Ensure Continuity
DWP	Office for Nuclear Reg.	1 Member	12 months	Planned Recruitment
HM Treasury	FCA	1 Chair	Two months	Planned Recruitment
Home Office	Technical Advisory Board	1 Member	12 months	Unplanned Vacancy
MoD	MTC IMB	2 Members	12 months	Unplanned Vacancy
MoD	North East VAPC	1 Chair	11 months	Unplanned Vacancy
MoD	Scotland VAPC	1 Chair	Nine months	Unplanned Vacancy
MoD	Scotland VAPC	1 Chair	Five months	Unplanned Vacancy
MoD	South West VAPC	1 Chair	Nine months	Unplanned Vacancy
MoD	London VAPC	1 Chair	Five months	Unplanned Vacancy
MoJ	PPO	1 Office Holder	10 months	Planned Recruitment
MoJ	Judicial Pensions Board	1 Chair	11 months	Unplanned Vacancy
UKEF	EGAC	1 Chair	12 months	Unplanned Vacancy
Welsh Government	Public Health Wales	1 Member	Nine months	Planned Recruitment
Welsh Government	IRP	1 Chair & 1 Member	Two years, 10 months	Planned Recruitment
Welsh Government	Nat. Resources Wales	2 Members	Six months	Planned Recruitment
Welsh Government	HEFCW	1 Chair	12 months	New Public Body
Welsh Government	Betsi Cadwaladr Uni Health Board	1 Chair & 3 Members	12 months	Unplanned Vacancy

Section 3.6: length of tenure

Subject to any statutory provisions, it is for ministers to decide on length of tenure. However, there is a strong presumption that no individual should serve more than two terms or serve in any one post for more than ten years. In exceptional cases, ministers may decide an individual's skills and expertise is needed beyond such a tenure. In such cases, the Commissioner should be notified.

Department	Body	Role(s)	Service	Extension
BEIS	NDA	1 Member	Three terms	Three months
BEIS	Low Pay Commission	1 Member	10 years	Six months
BEIS	ACAS	1 Member	Three terms	Two years
BEIS	CRM	1 Member	Two terms	Four years
DCMS	NHLF	1 Member	Two terms	Six months
DCMS	NHLF	1 Member	Two terms	Two years, Six months
DCMS	Wallace Collection	2 Members	Two terms	Six months
DCMS	Gambling Commission	2 Members	Two terms	Two years
Defra	Forestry Commission	1 Member	Two terms	Two years
Defra	Cotswold National Park	1 Member	Two terms	Nine months
Defra	Chilterns National Park	2 Members	Two terms	Three years
Defra	Northumberland National Park	2 Members	Two terms	One year
Defra	Natural England	1 Member	Three terms	Eight months
Defra	MMO	1 Member	Two terms	Four years
Defra	ACRE	1 Member	Two terms	Three years
Defra	ACRE	2 Members	Two terms	One year
DfE	Ofqual	1 Member	Two terms	Three years
DfE	CITB	1 Member	Two terms	12 months
DfT	British Transport Police Authority	1 Member	10 years	Six months
DfT	DPTAC	1 Chair	Three terms	Three months
HMT	Royal Mint Advisory Cttee	2 Members	Two terms	Two years
MoD	MCTC IMB	1 Member	Two terms	Five years
MoJ	Lay Observers	2 Members	Two terms	Five years

MoJ	JCIO	11 Members	Two terms	Nine months
MoJ	Parole Board	13 Members	Two terms	Five years
WG	HEFCW	1 Member	10 years	12 months
WG	Community Health Council	4 Members	Two terms	Two years
WG	NAVAW	1 Office Holder	Two terms	Five years
WG	IDAB	1 Member	Two terms	Three years
WG	Hybu Cig Cymru	2 Members	Two terms	Three years

Section 6.2: Senior Independent Panel Members

Summary of departmental lists of Senior Independent Panels Members used on campaigns in 2022-23. The list relates to chairs or chief commissioners unless otherwise indicated.

Department	Campaign	Name of SIPM
BEIS	British Business Bank	Chris Grigg
BEIS	Committee on Climate Change	Liv Garfield
BEIS	Low Pay Commission	Karen Jones
DCMS	Museum of the Home	Anand Aithal
DCMS	Historic England	Howell James
DCMS	Historic Royal Palaces	Alastair Bruce
DCMS	National Citizen Service	Elizabeth Buchanan
DCMS	VisitBritain (British Tourist Authority)	Peter Spencer
DfE	HM Chief Inspector of Education, Children's Services and Skills	Jo Saxton
DHSC	Health Services Safety Investigations Body	Jacqueline Dunkley-Bent
DLUHC	Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman	Wendy Barnes
HO	Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner	Olivia Grant
FCDO	Independent Commissioner for Aid Impact	Philip Augar
MoD	Service Police Complaints Commissioner	Cindy Butts
MoJ	Judicial Appointments Commission	Gisela Stuart
MoJ	Prison and Probation Ombudsman	Peter Spencer
NIO	Chief Electoral Officer	Deirdre Toner
WG	<i>The Welsh Government reported using these three SIPMS on seven campaigns for significant appointments in 2022-23. It was not clear from either WG or OCPA records which campaigns these were.</i>	Craig Stephenson
WG		Aaqil Ahmed
WG		Moawia Bin Sufyan

Appendix 3.1.1: list of bodies and offices regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments

A list of bodies and roles regulated by the Commissioner can be found in Schedule 1 of the Public Appointments Order in Council, the most recent version of which is available [here](#). The list of bodies is updated whenever a new Order is prepared and published by the Privy Council. In between the publication of revised Orders, ministers are able to agree with the Commissioner any new roles that should be regulated, through a consultation process described in Section 2(4) of the Order.

Attorney General's Office

Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy

Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service
British Business Bank, Chair only
British Hallmarking Council
Central Arbitration Committee
Certification Officer
Civil Nuclear Police Authority
Coal Authority
Committee on Climate Change
Committee on Fuel Poverty
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management
Competition and Markets Authority Board
Competition Appeal Tribunal
Competition Service
Electricity Settlements Company Ltd, Chair and Senior Independent Director only
Financial Reporting Council
Future System Operator
Gas and Electricity Markets Authority
Groceries Code Adjudicator
Labour Market Enforcement Director
Land Registry
Low Carbon Contracts Company Ltd, Chair and Senior Independent Director Only
Low Pay Commission
National Nuclear Laboratory
National Physical Laboratory (NPL) Management Ltd, Chair only
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
Nuclear Liabilities Fund
Oil and Gas Authority, Chair only
Ordnance Survey, Chair only
Post Office Ltd, Chair only
Pubs Code Adjudicator and Deputy Pubs Code Adjudicator
Regulatory Policy Committee
Small Business Commissioner
UK Atomic Energy Authority
UK Research and Innovation
Trade Remedies Authority

Cabinet Office

Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, excluding political members
Boundary Commission for England

Boundary Commission for Wales
Civil Service Pensions Board
Committee on Standards in Public Life, excluding political appointments
Equality and Human Rights Commission
House of Lords Appointment Commission, excluding political members
Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists
Security Vetting Appeals Panel
Senior Salaries Review Body
UK Statistics Authority Board

Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport

The Advisory Council on National Records and Archives
Arts Council England
Big Lottery Fund (The National Lottery Community Fund)
Birmingham Organising Committee for the 2022 Commonwealth Games Ltd
British Broadcasting Corporation
British Film Institute
British Library
British Museum
Charity Commission for England and Wales
Gambling Commission
Geffrye Museum
Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England
Historic Royal Palaces
Horniman Public Museum and Public Park Trust
Horserace Betting Levy Board
Imperial War Museum
Information Commissioner
National Citizen Service Trust
National Gallery
National Heritage Memorial Fund/Heritage Lottery Fund (The National Lottery Heritage Fund)
National Museums Liverpool
National Portrait Gallery
Natural History Museum
Office of Communications (Ofcom)
Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art and Objects of Cultural Interest
Royal Armouries
Royal Museums Greenwich
Science Museum Group
Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C)
Sport England

Sports Grounds Safety Authority
Tate
The Royal Parks
Theatres Trust
Treasure Valuation Committee
UK Sport
United Kingdom Anti-Doping Ltd
Victoria and Albert Museum
VisitBritain
VisitEngland
Wallace Collection

Department for Education

Adoption and Special Guardianship Leadership
Board, Chair only
Child Safeguarding Practice Review Panel
Children's Commissioner for England
Construction Industry Training Board
Engineering Construction Industry Training Board
Film Industry Training Board
Further Education Commissioner's Office, Further
Education Commissioner and Deputy Further
Education Commissioner only
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Education,
Children's Services and Skills
Independent Assessors for Student Finance,
Appeals and Complaints
Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical
Education
LocatEd
Office for Standards in Education, Children's
Services and Skills (Ofsted)
Office for Students
Office of Qualifications and Examinations
Regulation (Ofqual)
Residential Care Leadership Board, Chair only
School Teachers' Review Body
Social Mobility Commission
Social Work England
Student Loans Company Ltd

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Advisory Committee on Releases to the
Environment
Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board
British Wool Marketing Board
Broads Authority
Conservation Board for the Chilterns Area of
Outstanding Natural Beauty, with the
exception of parish members
Conservation Board for the Cotswolds Area of
Outstanding Natural Beauty, with the
exception of parish members
Consumer Council for Water
Covent Garden Market Authority
Environment Agency

Forestry Commission
Joint Nature Conservation Committee
Marine Management Organisation
National Park Authorities, with the exception of
parish members
Natural England
Regional Flood and Coastal Committees, Chair only
Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew
Science Advisory Council
Sea Fish Industry Authority
Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT)

Department for International Development

CDC Group Plc
Commonwealth Scholarship Commission
Independent Commission for Aid Impact

Department for Transport

British Transport Police Authority
Civil Aviation Authority
Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee
Dover Harbour Board, Chair only
East West Rail Company
Harwich Haven Authority, Chair only
Highways England, Chair only
HS2 Ltd
Independent Commission on Civil Aviation Noise
London and Continental Railways Ltd
Milford Haven Port Authority, Chair only
Network Rail, Chair only
Office of Rail and Road
Port of London Authority, Chair only
Port of Tyne Authority, Chair only
Traffic Commissioners
Transport Focus

Department for Work and Pensions

BPPTS Ltd
Health and Safety Executive
Industrial Injuries Advisory Council
Money and Pensions Service
National Employment Savings Trust
Office for Nuclear Regulation
Pension Protection Fund, Chair only
Pension Protection Fund Ombudsman
Pensions Ombudsman
Pensions Regulator
Social Security Advisory Committee

Department of Health and Social Care

Advisory Committee on Clinical Excellence Awards,
Chair and Medical Director only
Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation, Chair
only
British Pharmacopoeia Commission
Care Quality Commission
Commission on Human Medicines

Committee on Mutagenicity of Chemicals in Food,
 Consumer Products and the Environment
 Food Standards Agency
 Health and Social Care Information Centre (NHS
 Digital)
 Health Education England
 Health Research Authority
 Health Services Safety Investigations Body
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
 Human Tissue Authority
 Independent Reconfiguration Panel
 Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigations
 Special Health Authority
 Monitor (part of the operating body known as NHS
 Improvement)
 National Data Guardian
 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
 NHS Blood and Transplant
 NHS Business Services Authority
 NHS Commissioning Board (NHS England)
 NHS Counter Fraud Authority
 NHS Litigation Authority (NHS Resolution)
 NHS Pay Review Body
 NHS Trust Development Authority (part of the
 operating body known as NHS Improvement)
 NHS Trusts
 Office for Strategic Coordination of Health
 Research, Chair only
 Patient Safety Commissioner
 Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists'
 Remuneration

Export Credits Guarantee Department (UK Export Finance)

Export Guarantee Advisory Council

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Great Britain-China Centre
 Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission
 Westminster Foundation for Democracy

HM Treasury

Court of Directors of the Bank of England, with the
 exception of the Governor and Deputy
 Governors
 Crown Estate Commissioners
 Financial Conduct Authority
 National Savings and Investments
 Royal Mint Advisory Committee on the Design of
 Coins, Medals, Seals and Decorations
 UK Government Investments

Home Office

Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs
 Animals in Science Committee
 Appointed Person under the Proceeds of Crime Act
 2002

Biometric and Forensics Ethics Group
 College of Policing Board of Directors
 Commissioner for the Retention and Use of
 Biometric Material
 Disclosure and Barring Service
 Forensic Science Regulator
 Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority
 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and
 Fire & Rescue Services
 Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner
 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and
 Immigration
 Independent Family Returns Panel
 Independent Monitor of the Disclosure and Barring
 Service
 Independent Office for Police Conduct
 Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation
 Members of the Visiting Committee of any
 immigration removal centre or short-term
 holding facility
 Migration Advisory Committee
 National Crime Agency Remuneration Review Body
 Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner
 Police Advisory Board for England and Wales
 Police Remuneration Review Body
 Security Industry Authority
 Surveillance Camera Commissioner
 Technical Advisory Board (for the Regulation of
 Investigatory Powers Act 2000), with the
 exception of Agency Members

Ministry of Defence

Armed Forces Pay Review Body
 Defence Nuclear Safety Committee
 Independent Medical Expert Group
 Independent Monitoring Board for the Military
 Corrective Training Centre
 Nuclear Research Advisory Council
 Oil and Pipelines Agency
 Royal Air Force Museum
 Science Advisory Committee on the Medical
 Implications of Less-Lethal Weapons
 Service Complaints Ombudsman
 Service Police Complaints Commissioner
 Single Source Regulations Office
 Veterans Advisory and Pensions Committees

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

Architects Registration Board
 Building Regulation Advisory Committee
 Commission for Local Administration in England
 (Local Government and Social Care
 Ombudsman)
 Ebbsfleet Development Corporation
 Homes England
 Leasehold Advisory Service (LEASE)

Regulator of Social Housing
The Housing Ombudsman
Valuation Tribunal Service

Ministry of Justice

Advisory Committees on Justices of the Peace
Advisory Council on Conscientious Objectors
Chair of the National Council of Prisoner Escort
and Custody Services Lay Observers
Children and Family Court Advisory and Support
Service
Civil Justice Council
Civil Procedure Rule Committee
Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses (Victims'
Commissioner)
Court Examiners
Court of Protection Visitors
Criminal Cases Review Commission
Criminal Procedure Rule Committee
Family Procedure Rule Committee
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Probation
Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody
Independent Monitoring Board of any prison or
young offender institution
Insolvency Rules Committee
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman
Judicial Appointments Commission
Judicial Pension Board, independent Chair and
independent members only
Law Commission, with the exception of the Chair
Legal Services Board
Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements Lay
Advisers
National Chair of the Independent Monitoring
Boards
National Mental Capacity Forum, Chair only
Non-Judicial Members of Disciplinary Panels of the
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Parole Board, with the exception of judicial
members
Persons appointed by the Lord Chancellor under
section 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
Prisoner Escort and Custody Services Lay
Observers
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman
Prison Service Pay Review Body
Sentencing Council for England and Wales
Tribunal Procedure Committee
Youth Justice Board for England and Wales

Northern Ireland Office

Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland
Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland
Equality Commission for Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
Parades Commission for Northern Ireland

Scotland Office

Boundary Commission for Scotland

Welsh Government

Advisory Panel to the Welsh Language
Commissioner
Agricultural Advisory Panel for Wales
All Wales Medicines Strategy Group
All Wales Programme Monitoring Committee for
the European Structural Funds
Amgueddfa Cymru - National Museum of Wales
Aneurin Bevan Community Health Council
Aneurin Bevan University Local Health Board
Animal Health and Welfare Framework Group
Arts Council of Wales
Betsi Cadwaladr Community Health Council
Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
Board of Community Health Councils
Brecon Beacons National Park Authority
Cardiff & Vale Community Health Council
Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
Career Choices Dewis Gyrfa
Children's Commissioner for Wales
Commissioner for Older People in Wales
Cwm Taf Morgannwg Community Health Council
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health
Board
Design Commission for Wales
Digital Health and Care Wales
Education & Skills Ministerial Advisory Group
Education Workforce Council
Future Generations Commissioner
Health Education Improvement Wales
Higher Education Funding Council for Wales
Hybu Cig Cymru
Hywel Dda Community Health Council
Hywel Dda University Health Board
Independent Remuneration Panel for Wales
Industry Wales
Life Sciences Hub Wales Board
Local Government Boundary Commission for
Wales
National Academy for Educational Leadership
National Adviser for Violence against Women and
other forms of Gender-based Violence,
Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence
National Library of Wales
Natural Resources Wales
Pembrokeshire Coast National Park Authority
Powys Community Health Council
Powys Teaching Health Board
Public Health Wales NHS Trust
Qualifications Wales

Regulatory Board for Wales
 Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical
 Monuments of Wales
 Snowdonia National Park Authority
 Social Care Wales
 Sports Council for Wales
 Swansea Bay Community Health Council

Swansea Bay University Local Health Board
 Velindre National Health Services Trust
 Welsh Ambulance Services National Health Service
 Trust
 Welsh Industrial Development Advisory Board
 Welsh Language Commissioner
 Welsh Revenue Authority

Appendix 3.2: list of significant appointments requiring a Senior Independent Panel Member

A list of 'significant appointments' has been agreed by ministers and the Commissioner. These appointments are distinguished by the fact that Senior Independent Panel Members are appointed to the Advisory Assessment Panels supporting the relevant minister to find a suitable candidate for the role. Because these appointments are deemed to be particularly important, the SIPM provides additional assurance that the Governance Code and Principles of Public Appointments have been adhered to during a campaign. The list relates to chairs of bodies unless otherwise indicated.

Cabinet Office

Advisory Committee on Business Appointments
 Committee on Standards in Public Life
 Equality and Human Rights Commission
 House of Lords Appointments Commission
 Senior Salaries Review Body
 UK Statistics Authority

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy

ACAS
 British Business Bank plc
 Certification Officer
 Committee on Climate Change
 Competition and Markets Authority
 Future Systems Operator
 Groceries Code Adjudicator
 Innovate UK
 Land Registry
 Low Pay Commission
 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
 Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
 Post Office Ltd
 Pubs Code Adjudicator
 UK Green Investment Bank
 UKRI

Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport

Arts Council England
 British Film Institute
 British Library
 British Museum
 BBC
 Big Lottery Fund
 Charity Commission for England and Wales
 Gambling Commission
 Heritage Lottery Fund
 Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for
 England

Historic Royal Palaces
 Information Commissioner
 National Citizen Service
 National Museums Liverpool
 Office of Communications (Ofcom)
 Science Museum Group
 Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C)
 Sport England
 The Royal Parks
 UK Sport
 Victoria and Albert Museum
 VisitBritain
 Imperial War Museum
 National Gallery
 National Portrait Gallery
 Natural History Museum
 Royal Museums Greenwich
 Tate
 Wallace Collection

Ministry of Defence

Service Complaints Ombudsman
 Service Police Complaints Commissioner

Department for Education

Children's Commissioner for England
 HM Chief Inspector of Education, Children's
 Services and Skills
 Ofqual
 Ofsted
 Office for Students
 Student Loans Company
 Social Mobility Commission

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Environment Agency
 Forestry Commission
 Kew

Natural England
Office of Environmental Protection
Water Services Regulatory Authority

Department for Health and Social Care

Care Quality Commission
Food Standards Agency
Health Services Safety Investigations Body
Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority
Independent Patient Safety Commissioner
NHS Commissioning Board (NHS England)
NHS Improvement
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence

Department for Transport

British Transport Police Authority
Civil Aviation Authority
Highways England
HS2 Ltd
Network Rail
Office of Road and Rail

Department for Work and Pensions

Health and Safety Executive
Pensions Ombudsman
Pension Protection Fund Ombudsman
Pensions Regulator
Social Security Advisory Committee

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

Independent Commission for Aid Impact

Home Office

Director General of Independent Office for Police Conduct
HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation
Independent Anti-Slavery Commission

Northern Ireland Office

Equality Commission for Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
Chief Electoral Officer

HM Treasury

Court of Directors of the Bank of England
Crown Estate Commissioners
Financial Conduct Authority

Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities

Homes England
Regulator of Social Housing

Local Commissioners for Administration in England
(Local Government and Social Care
Ombudsman)

Ministry of Justice

Criminal Cases Review Commission
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons
HM Chief Inspector of Probation
Prison and Probation Ombudsman
Youth Justice Board for England & Wales

Welsh Government

Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board
Amgueddfa Cymru – National Museum Wales
Aneurin Bevan University Health Board
Arts Council of Wales
Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
Care Council for Wales
Children's Commissioner for Wales
Commissioner for Older People in Wales
Cwm Taf University Health Board
Digital Health and Care Wales
Future Generations Commissioner
Higher Education Funding Council for Wales
Hywel Dda University Health Board
National Library of Wales
Natural Resources Wales
Powys Teaching Health Board
Qualification Wales
Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales
Sports Council for Wales
Velindre NHS Trust
Welsh Ambulance Service NHS Trust
Welsh Language Commissioner

Contact the Commissioner

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