



The Commissioner for Public Appointments

Annual Report

2023|24

At a glance

The work of the
Commissioner for Public
Appointments in 2023-24

134

requests from twenty
different departments

44

section 6.2 consultations on
Senior Independent Panel
Members

53

section 3.3 consultations
on appointments without
competition

10

complaints heard and
mitigated

34

section 3.6 notifications of
exceptional reappointments or
extensions to tenure

6

breaches identified and
mitigated

2

notifications of new bodies or
offices added to the
Commissioner's remit

1

section 6.1 addition to the list
of significant appointments

Contents

6	Commissioner's Foreword
	Introduction
9	The role of the Commissioner
10	Annual audit 2023-24
13	Commissioner Commendations
14	Compliance with the Governance Code
16	Consultations and notifications
16	Senior Independent Panel Members
18	Complaints
19	Breaches, inquiries and investigations
23	Appendices

Commissioner's Foreword

May this year will mark thirty years since the Committee on Standards in Public Life, led by Lord Nolan, proposed seven principles which should underpin conduct in public life – honesty, integrity, objectivity, accountability, selflessness, openness and leadership. Nolan and his committee recommended, too, that these principles should be incorporated into codes of conduct, with adherence supported by independent scrutiny and education.

The present system for monitoring public appointments holds largely to this structure. Nolan's principles are reflected in the principles of public appointments, as his recommendations are reflected in the Governance Code. I, as Commissioner, provide independent assurance that any proposed appointments are made in accordance with the principles and the Code.

The Code also describes the required contents of my annual report. The report 'should examine compliance' with the principles and the Code; and it 'should include statistical information on appointments and track progress on increasing diversity'. To emphasise the two-fold nature of these requirements and to ensure that equal weight is given to both parts, this year the report is in two separate sections. The second part will contain the required statistical information and analysis of diversity in public appointments.

This first part, here, offers an account of the overall state of public appointments. In last year's annual report, I wrote that the public appointments system works well. I repeat that overall conclusion, while making qualifications below.

Changes in my overall findings result in part from a change in the method by which I audit

departments. As noted in last year's annual report, my team moved in 2022-23 away from the forensic analysis of a small number of campaigns that had characterised previous audits and towards a broader thematic survey. This year, like last, departments were asked a range of questions about the manner in which they run campaigns.

One of these questions was as follows: 'What challenges does the departmental public appointments team experience that it believes are common to the public appointments system as a whole?'

Several departments noted, in their responses to this question, that a large number of the highest-profile appointments were subject to a sometimes lengthy process of consultation with the Prime Minister's office. I understand that these processes are not new, but they had not figured so prominently in my office's previous audits.

Officials in some departments expressed concerns about this process of consultation with the Prime Minister's office. Their criticisms included the slowness and lack of openness of the process.

It is to be expected that the Prime Minister's office will take a view on public appointments. As Lord Grimstone observed in his 2016 review of public appointments, 'The Prime Minister has a direct role in appointments made by The Queen and in those appointments for which he has statutory responsibility. Additionally, some appointments are so important to public life in the UK, the Prime Minister will understandably want to be involved. In such cases, the process must be designed from the start to accommodate this.' One of the most important of Lord Nolan's requirements is

that of ministerial accountability. The Prime Minister is ultimately responsible for every action taken by his government and it is therefore inevitable that his office requires consultation on the most important vacancies.

But problems arise if this is not done according to the Governance Code, in an 'open and transparent' manner.

My audit heard allegations from departments that in 2023-24 the government failed to make some of its highest-profile appointments in accordance with this principle.

I recommend, therefore, that the whole process of consultation on appointments between departments and the Prime Minister's office be treated with much greater transparency, according to the Nolan Principles.

My audit of departments and my regular work on compliance revealed two other matters of particular importance.

First, I was disappointed to learn that the proportion of campaigns meeting the three-month aim fell again in 2023-24. The proportion was 25% in 2021-22. It fell to 16% in 2022-23. It now stands at just 13%. This is very damaging to the whole appointments process.

Increased transparency and better data, provided through the government's new Applicant Tracking System, may improve timeliness.

But both departments and the Prime Minister's office must make more determined efforts to keep every competition up to speed. Pace and grip are essential at all times.

The second matter is a specific kind of breach, relating to disclosure of political activity, which occurred once in 2022-23 and then

three more times in 2023-24. In these four instances, departments used independent panel members who were politically active, which was not disclosed. The Governance Code states that such activity should not be a bar to service on an advisory assessment panel, but the activity should be publicly disclosed.

These four instances are not huge in number amongst the hundreds of appointments my office monitors each year. But vigilance is vital to maintain the integrity of the entire process – there must be no fear that independent panel members could have undisclosed political activity.

I will continue to press for rigorous observance of the Nolan Principles on all these issues. I wish to leave, at the conclusion of my term, in late 2026, a public appointments system that is transparent, coherent and efficient – a system fair to applicants and appointees alike.

William Shawcross CVO
Commissioner for Public Appointments

The Principles of Public Appointments

The Principles of Public Appointments apply to all those involved with public appointments processes.

Ministerial Responsibility

The ultimate responsibility for appointments and thus the selection of those appointed rests with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions and actions. Welsh Ministers are accountable to Senedd Cymru, Welsh Parliament.

Selflessness

Ministers when making appointments should act solely in terms of the public interest.

Integrity

Ministers when making appointments must avoid placing themselves under any obligation to people or organisations that might try inappropriately to influence them in their work.

They should not act or take decisions in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends.

They must declare and resolve any interests and relationships.

Merit

All public appointments should be governed by the principle of appointment on merit.

This means providing Ministers with a choice of high quality candidates, drawn from a strong, diverse field, whose skills, experiences and qualities have been judged to meet the needs of the public body or statutory office in question.

Openness

Processes for making public appointments should be open and transparent.

Diversity

Public appointments should reflect the diversity of the society in which we live and appointments should be made taking account of the need to appoint boards which include a balance of skills and backgrounds.

Assurance

There should be established assurance processes with appropriate checks and balances.

The Commissioner for Public Appointments has an important role in providing independent assurance that public appointments are made in accordance with these Principles and this Governance Code.

Fairness

Selection processes should be fair, impartial and each candidate must be assessed against the same criteria for the role in question.

Introduction

The role of the Commissioner

The role of the Commissioner for Public Appointments is a little less than thirty years old. The process it safeguards, though, is one with a long history.

Under our constitutional monarchy, the crown retains formal prerogative powers which operate within a framework of parliamentary authority and statutory oversight. Parliament is the ultimate source of legal authority, shaping governance through statutory and democratic constraints on the prerogative.

With the continual expansion of government in recent decades, good governance becomes ever harder. By 1979 successive governments had established more than 2,000 non-departmental public bodies and their perceived wastefulness had become a political target. The Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s closed around half of these bodies; at the same time, though, their 'agencification' policies opened a raft of new ones. The *Next Steps* report of 1988 recommended the establishment of 120 such agencies, including the Met Office and the DVLA, using them to introduce new, private sector management techniques into government.¹

In 1995, in response to a number of scandals, the Major government established the Committee on Standards in Public Life. In the six months available to them, the committee

¹ Grant Dalton and Matthew Gill, 'Public bodies reform' (25 January 2022), <instituteforgovernment.org.uk>.

² Nolan and the committee referred to 'quangos' (quasi non-government organisations) and 'NHS bodies', rather than 'arm's length bodies'. Lord Nolan and the Committee on Standards in Public

Box 1: 'General Recommendations' of the *First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life* (1995)

Principles of Public Life

The general principles of conduct which underpin public life need to be restated: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership.

Codes of Conduct

All public bodies should draw up Codes of Conduct incorporating these principles.

Independent Scrutiny

Internal systems for maintaining standards should be supported by independent scrutiny.

Education

More needs to be done to promote and reinforce standards of conduct in public bodies, in particular through guidance and training, including induction training.¹

First Report, p. 3.

focused on issues relating to MPs, ministers, civil servants and arm's length bodies.² The committee's *First Report*, published in May 1995, drew four conclusions for general application across public service (see **Box 1**).

Alongside these broad conclusions, the committee made more granular recommendations in each of its four subject areas. In its consideration of arm's length bodies, the committee formalised the historic system: appointments are the responsibility of ministers; in making those appointments, though, ministers must take independent advice.³ That advice would come usually from advisory panels.

To monitor this system, the report recommended the institution of a 'Public

Life, Standards in Public Life: First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1995), p. iii.

³ Independent Scrutiny was one of just four general recommendations made in the report: 'Internal systems for maintaining standards should be supported by independent scrutiny'. Nolan Committee, *First Report*, p. 3.

Appointments Commissioner'.⁴ Today, the Commissioner is tasked with monitoring the procedures adopted by appointing authorities when making appointments to public bodies.⁵ His role in doing so and his relationship with other parts of the regulatory system are established in the Public Appointments Order in Council and the Governance Code on Public Appointments.

The Order in Council – a type of primary legislation made in the name and presence of the monarch, by and with the advice and consent of the Privy Council – has primacy. Its first two articles set out when it comes into effect and how it should be interpreted; its fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh describe the functions, powers and duties of the Commissioner and how they should be exercised; two schedules at the end of the Order list the bodies and offices regulated by the Commissioner (Schedule 1) and the specified employee posts which are to be public appointments (Schedule 2).⁶ The Order's third article makes provision for a Governance Code.⁷

Under this system, ministerial responsibility is paramount. The Governance Code requires that the minister is consulted on describing and advertising the role (including on length of tenure and remuneration), on the use of recruitment consultants, on the composition of the advisory assessment panel (and who chairs it), on the assessment strategy of the panel and on the selection processes to be

used.⁸ Ministers are able to suggest candidates, to meet candidates and to provide to the panel their views of the candidates at all stages of a competition.⁹ They are able, finally, to reject a panel's view that a candidate falls below the standard required for appointment – a standard for which the minister sets the criteria and determines the method of assessment – and able to appoint that candidate against the panel's advice.¹⁰

Ministers are required to consult the Commissioner when they appoint a candidate to a role without competition, to notify him where they decide to extend the tenure of an appointee in a role beyond two terms or a total of ten years.¹¹ The Commissioner provides assurance that such practices occur only in exceptional circumstances and are not a routine practice, with the majority of roles filled through open, fair and merit-based processes.

Annual audit 2022-23

The annual report is central to the public accountability of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. To ensure it presents an accurate picture of public appointments, it is informed by a detailed audit of processes in departments across government. The Order in Council mandates the audit:

The Commissioner must, in the manner the Commissioner thinks fit, carry out an audit

⁴ The Commissioner's work 'would mirror the approach now taken by Civil Service Commissioners'. Nolan Committee, *First Report*, p. 77.

⁵ This description of the Commissioner's role is given in the long title of the Public Appointments Order in Council. More specifically, his role is to provide independent assurance that campaigns are run according to the principles of public appointments. Governance Code on Public Appointments, <assets.publishing.service.gov.uk>, sections 1.2 and 2.1; hereafter Governance Code.

⁶ All these specified employee posts are executive chairs of major research bodies.

⁷ [Public Appointments \(No. 2\) Order in Council 2023](#), article 3; hereafter Order in Council.

⁸ Governance Code, sections 3.1, 5.1 and 5.3.

⁹ Governance Code, section 3.1.

¹⁰ Governance Code, section 3.2. If a minister chooses to appoint someone not deemed 'appointable' by an advisory assessment panel, they must consult the Commissioner, must write to the relevant select committee and must appear before it if requested by the committee chair. This requirement was introduced in February 2024; it applies only to appointments made by UK Government ministers, not Welsh Government ministers.

¹¹ Governance Code, sections 3.3 and 3.6.

*of the procedures and practices followed by appointing authorities in making public appointments.*¹²

The audit is a vital instrument in the Commissioner's work to provide assurance that public appointments are made in a fair and open manner. It allows sponsor departments and the Welsh Government to demonstrate current practices; it gives them the opportunity to reflect on areas of particular strength and to consider areas of relative weakness. It enables officials to share effective innovations between appointment teams and to learn from others.

This year solidified and built on last year's changes to the audit process. The departments and the Welsh Government were asked a broader set of questions and were required to provide the Commissioner with a different set of information compared to previous years.

This survey replaced a more forensic analysis of a narrower set of campaigns delivered by specific departments. There are certainly benefits to both approaches, but the change has been considered at length and decided on the basis of the available evidence. The Commissioner and his office analysed breaches uncovered through the audit – under the previous audit regime – and through other means. The analysis revealed the previous system, though resource-intensive, tended to uncover small, technical breaches, which had a relatively low chance of damaging confidence in the public appointments system. The new audit regime, in contrast, focuses on those breaches which the Commissioner considers to pose the greatest potential damage to public perceptions of the system.

¹² Order in Council, article 4(2). The Code makes two further references to the audit – confirming its purpose to provide data for the annual report and confirming, too, that departments should publish the necessary 'real-time' data on individual appointments. Governance Code, sections 4.2 and 8.3.

One disappointment in the audit process relates to data. Last year's annual report stated the Commissioner's expectation that the Cabinet Office's new Applicant Tracking System (ATS) would both simplify the process of conducting the audit and improve the detail and timeliness of data on public appointments. It was expected, in particular, that the ATS might provide a more detailed snapshot of processes at all stages of campaigns. This may happen in the future. Regrettably, though, it did not happen in time for publication of the present report. The Commissioner will analyse and publish that data as a statistical annex to this report in due course. The Commissioner also looks forward to gaining access to an ATS dashboard, as discussed in a Public Accounts Committee hearing in March 2024.¹³

In conducting his audit, the Commissioner was pleased to note the formation of two new departmental teams dedicated to public appointments. In last year's annual report, the Commissioner noted inconsistencies in the methods by which different departments manage their public appointments and, more important, the results of these inconsistencies – with better compliance and customer care delivered by those departments with a central team charged with managing public appointments. This, of course, is the system recommended in the Governance Code, a 'specific central team or unit' allowing expertise to be retained and capacity built in one place.¹⁴ As of last year, two departments – HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office – lacked a central team. Both, though, had plans to put such a team in place. In their audit return, HM Treasury stated that the department had now recruited a Head of Public Appointments and Governance to lead an envisaged team of four, working closely with individual arm's

¹³ Public Accounts Committee, Oral evidence: Non-executive director appointments, HC 460 (18 March 2024), <committees.parliament.uk>, Q97 and Q98.

¹⁴ Governance Code, section 7.2.

length body sponsor teams.¹⁵ The Cabinet Office built its team more quickly, with five full-time equivalent staff. The team is responsible for the end-to-end delivery of appointments to regulated public bodies and arm's length bodies. For 2022-23, the lack of a central team in the Cabinet Office contributed to the department's inability to answer fifteen of the Commissioner's audit questions; for 2023-24, the department was still unable to answer the Commissioner's questions in five areas, arguing reasonably that the team was only established in early January 2024. The Cabinet Office's team is establishing new information management systems so that it can engage fully with next year's audit.

The Commissioner will monitor these changes closely. He hopes that they will lead, at first slowly and then at greater length, to improvements to the long-standing systems of public appointments.

¹⁵ As of October 2024, HM Treasury has successfully recruited the envisaged four-person team.

Commissioner Commendations

As part of the Commissioner's annual audit for 2023-24, he asked departmental teams what innovative solutions they had used to address general or particular challenges. The Commissioner was glad to note the following attempts to improve the appointments system. He recognises, at the same time, that not all of these innovations will be possible or appropriate in all departmental contexts.

Department for Culture, Media and Sport

Coming to an agreement with special advisers to wait until shortlist stage to receive views and approval from the Prime Minister's office on those positions with Prime Ministerial interest.

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero

Using the ATS talent function to identify potential candidates within the regions and reaching out to them ahead of campaigns being launched.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Creating and posting on social media videos in which younger board members from a range of backgrounds talk about the important work they do, to encourage applicants from a different section of society.

Department of Health and Social Care

Using a search company, at low cost, to grow a strong talent pipeline and carrying out high-level due diligence checks on candidates in advance, helping to avoid future problems.

Home Office

Establishing weekly meetings with special advisers to discuss specific, hard-to-fill roles.

Ministry of Justice

Operating a proportionate tiered approach to campaigns, using delegations to help assist efforts to meet the three-month aim.

Compliance with the Governance Code

This section presents the Commissioner's involvement overseeing compliance with the Governance Code on Public Appointments. In its second half it will discuss specific consultations of and notifications to him by ministers, complaints he received and breaches he uncovered. More broadly, though, the Commissioner had two chief concerns in 2023-24. The first was timeliness, a regrettable perennial; the second was transparency in systems for making public appointments.

The Governance Code sets out an ideal time period in which appointments be made: 'the aim should always be to conclude the process within three months of a competition closing'.¹⁶ There are several factors that make this aim difficult to achieve, including, in some cases, the requirement that appointees receive the required security clearance. As part of his annual audit, the Commissioner asked departmental teams for the number of campaigns for regulated public appointments they ran in 2023-24 and for the number of those campaigns which met the Governance Code's aim. Departments and the Welsh Government together reported that they ran 319 campaigns in 2023-24.¹⁷ Of these, 41 (or 13%) concluded within the three-month aim.¹⁸ From the 2019 'high' of 50% of campaigns meeting the aim, this key metric has thus fallen to 25% in 2021-22, 16% in 2022-23 and now 13% in 2023-24. Such delays are debilitating for public bodies, as the Commissioner has said before; the effect on candidates is unacceptable.¹⁹

The second concern frequently raised by departments with the Commissioner's office

in 2023-24 was transparency, relating in particular to the process of consultation with the Prime Minister's office.

This process of consultation was not new in 2023-24. In previous years, however, it has not figured so prominently in responses to the Commissioner's audit of departments. The ability to capture broader issues of this kind stems from revisions made to the audit process in 2022-23. The new approach moved away from a forensic analysis of a small group of campaigns and towards a broader thematic survey, with departments asked a range of questions about the manner in which they run campaigns.

In the 2023-24 audit, one of these questions was as follows: 'What challenges does the departmental public appointments team experience that it believes are common to the public appointments system as a whole?' Several departments noted, in their responses to this question, that a large number of appointments were subject to sometimes lengthy processes of consultation with the Prime Minister's office.

As Lord Grimstone observed in his 2016 review of public appointments, 'The Prime Minister has a direct role in appointments made by The Queen and in those appointments for which he has statutory responsibility'. The Prime Minister has this direct role in around sixty appointments. Lord Grimstone also addressed a second group of appointments: 'Additionally, some appointments are so important to public life in the UK, the Prime Minister will understandably want to be involved. In such

¹⁶ Governance Code, section 7.8.

¹⁷ The Cabinet Office public appointments team was unable to provide either the number of campaigns the department ran for regulated public appointments in 2023-24 or the number of campaigns which concluded within three months.

¹⁸ These figures were provided by public appointments teams in UK government departments and the Welsh Government.

¹⁹ PACAC, Oral evidence: the Work of the Commissioner for Public Appointments (HC 1577) (4 July 2023), <committees.parliament.uk>, Q2.

cases, the process must be designed from the start to accommodate this.’ During the audit, departments indicated that in 2023-24 this second group was roughly twice the size of the first. In total, almost two hundred public bodies had at least one appointment designated as being of interest to the Prime Minister.

As Lord Grimstone emphasised, consulting the office of the Prime Minister is essential both where it is constitutionally required and where it is appropriate due to the strategic importance of certain roles. Ministerial accountability, a core principle of the Nolan framework, underpins this involvement.

It is essential that the process must be managed carefully to avoid delays. One department suggested that the process of consultation with the Prime Minister’s office could hypothetically extend the process by two weeks at each of five stages, leading to ten-week delays overall; another department said the process ‘hard-wired in failure to meet the three-month target’. Where necessary, departments have a responsibility to engage the Prime Minister’s office as early as possible; for its part, the Prime Minister’s office must ensure that its involvement does not create a bottleneck in the appointments process.

The Commissioner’s role is to provide assurance that appointments are made in accordance with the eight principles of public appointments. The fifth of these is the principle of openness, which states that ‘processes for making public appointments should be open and transparent’. During the 2023-24 audit, some departmental officials raised concerns that consultations with the Prime Minister’s office had not been disclosed to candidates. It has been suggested that this may be contrary to the overriding principle of openness and transparency.

The Commissioner is grateful that this matter has been drawn to his attention. He agrees that greater transparency is always beneficial and welcomes efforts to encourage best

practice where possible. However, consultation across government is an important part of ensuring effective oversight of public bodies and public appointments. As Grimstone made clear, the Prime Minister has an established role in the appointment process and his responsibility for the overall actions of government, alongside his office’s unique role in managing stakeholder relationships and ensuring that collective responsibility is upheld, makes consultation on key appointments both necessary and justified. It should come as no surprise to candidates that the Prime Minister’s office is involved in important public appointments.

Nonetheless, it has been suggested that transparency could be improved by publishing a comprehensive list of all public appointments of interest to the Prime Minister. This idea has significant merit, and the Commissioner would very much welcome a decision by the government to publish such a list, as well as a description of the processes involved. The government of course would have to consider whether publication of such a list would have unintended consequences. Publication would have to strike a balance between not constraining the Prime Minister’s ability to engage with public appointments and ensuring processes are open and transparent to candidates.

To enhance transparency and improve candidate awareness of consultations, the government should consider amending the standard public appointments advertisement template. For example, each advertisement, whether formally designated as of interest to the Prime Minister or not, could state that appointments may be made after consultation across government, including with the Prime Minister’s office and the Cabinet Office. This approach would increase openness, provide greater clarity to candidates, and preserve the flexibility needed for effective governance. By embedding transparency in this way, the government can uphold the principle of ‘transparency’ in the Governance Code while fostering a more efficient and collaborative appointments process.

Given that there has been a recent change of Government, the Commissioner is keen to engage with the Prime Minister's office and other interested parties over the next financial year to improve transparency around the involvement of the Prime Minister's office in the appointment process whilst simultaneously preserving the flexibility needed to ensure effective governance.

Consultations and notifications

The Commissioner was consulted or notified by ministers 134 times in 2023-24. These included:

- 53 consultations on ministerial decisions, under section 3.3 of the Governance Code, to make appointments without competition (**Figure 1** and **Figure 2**);
- 44 consultations on the appointment of Senior Independent Panel Members for campaigns for significant appointments, under section 6.2 of the Governance Code;
- 34 notifications of decisions by ministers, under section 3.6 of the Governance Code, to extend the tenure of public appointees beyond either two terms or a total of ten years (**Figure 3**);
- Two consultations, under article 2(4) of the Order in Council, about treating new public appointments as though they were regulated;
- One request to make an addition to the list of significant appointments, under section 6.1 of the Governance Code.

The Commissioner was not consulted or notified about ministers delegating responsibility for making appointments to any other body or person, under section 3.1 of the Governance Code. No minister chose to appoint a candidate deemed unappointable by an advisory assessment panel; the Commissioner therefore received no

consultations under section 3.2 of the Governance Code. **Appendix 2** contains a full list of ministerial consultations and notifications of the Commissioner in 2023-24.

The number of consultations and notifications was slightly higher than in previous years, with the Commissioner having been consulted or notified 96 times in 2022-23, 91 times in 2021-22 and 120 times in 2020-21.

It is important to emphasise that these exceptional appointments and reappointments represent a small proportion of annual totals. There continues to be significant public pressure on any potential or perceived unfairness in appointments, particularly those appointments to the most visible and influential posts. This pressure, along with the provisions of the Governance Code, ensures that appointments without competition and extensions to tenure are used only when there is no alternative – and not as a means of circumventing open competitions, judged in a fair manner on the basis of merit.

Senior Independent Panel Members

There were increases across all three of the major categories – under sections 3.3, 3.6 and 6.2 of the Governance Code. Of these, the most noticeable increase was in the number of consultations on Senior Independent Panel Members (SIPMs). There were 20 such consultations in 2022-23, more than doubling to 44 in 2023-24.

SIPMs are individuals familiar with senior recruitment and with the Governance Code, including the principles of public appointments. The Code requires that such individuals sit on all panels for significant appointments.²⁰

The increase in SIPM consultations is, in itself, neither good nor bad. Some reasons for the increase are natural: in a five-year cycle, in

²⁰ Governance Code, section 6.1.

Figure 1: Section 3.3 consultations of the Commissioner, by department 2023-24




Figure 2: Section 3.3 consultations of the Commissioner, by reason, 2023-24





Figure 3: Section 3.6 consultations of the Commissioner, by department, 2023-24



which campaigns are paused and restarted either side of a general election, there is likely to be a sorting or a bunching around those dates. Allied to this natural sorting effect, though, is a cause more political and purposeful – a keenness by a sitting administration to ensure campaigns are run and appointments made before an anticipated election date.

The process set out in the Governance Code encourages SIPMs to be chosen in one of two ways – either from a list of candidates known to the department or from conversations with ministers and their advisers. This does not encourage the use of SIPMs who are entirely independent of the department and political parties. It is good practice for a different person to serve as SIPM on each campaign a department runs. This is to ensure that SIPMs retain their independence from the department, but the Commissioner does recognise that it can cause issues for those departments running large numbers of campaigns for significant appointments.

The doubling of SIPM consultations in 2023-24 included two concerning trends.

First, some departments asked to consult the Commissioner on multiple SIPMs for a single campaign, with the specific individual to be chosen later by the minister. The Governance Code states that ‘Ministers must agree who the SIPM should be for each competition and should consult the Commissioner for Public Appointments ahead of the process commencing’.²¹ The order of the sentence should be the order of the process, with the minister choosing the SIPM and, subsequently, consulting the Commissioner on his or her choice.

Second, some departmental officials put forward individuals who had been politically active and who the officials suspected, therefore, to be incompatible with the Governance Code’s requirements for the role

of SIPM. For the simple reason of efficiency, it is imperative that officials feel able to tell ministers that suggested SIPMs are unsuitable without recourse to the Commissioner.

Many departments stated in their responses to the audit that they used the list of previous SIPMs published in the annual report to find new potential panel members. The list is published in **Appendix 2**, as part of the full list of consultations and notifications of the Commissioner in 2023-24.

Complaints

The Commissioner welcomes complaints about the appointments process, viewing them as essential both to the healthy regulation of the system and to his own responsibilities in providing assurance.

The Order in Council states that the Commissioner ‘may conduct an inquiry into the procedures and practices followed by an appointing authority in relation to any public appointment whether in response to a complaint or otherwise’.²² The Governance Code expands as follows:

*The Commissioner should consider complaints made about a public appointments process. Complaints should be raised with the appointing department in the first instance, which is responsible for having effective complaints handling procedures, for making applicants aware of their right to complain and for referring them to the Commissioner’s complaints procedures. If, after investigation by the department, the complainant remains dissatisfied, they may bring their complaint to the Commissioner for Public Appointments.*²³

The key requirement for complainants, then, is that they have first raised their complaint with the relevant department.

²¹ Governance Code, section 6.2.

²² Order in Council, article 4(4).

²³ Governance Code, section 4.4.

As part of the annual audit, UK Government departments reported a total of 13 complaints in the year between April 2023 and March 2024; three of these complaints were upheld.²⁴ The Welsh Government received seven complaints in the same period and reported that all were satisfactorily resolved.

In 2023-24, the Commissioner received ten complaints.²⁵ None was ultimately found to be within his remit, as set out by the Order in Council and the Governance Code and so none went forward to the Commissioner for his detailed consideration and investigation. This was most frequently because the complaint concerned the outcome of a public appointment process, rather than the process itself. Other complaints concerned the actions of people outside the process and were matters which should properly be addressed by an authority other than the Commissioner. Two complaints, finally, required discussion first with the relevant departmental teams.

The issue, then, is broader understanding of the Commissioner's remit and the process he and his office conduct when deciding whether or not to investigate following a complaint.

Anyone may complain to the Commissioner for Public Appointments, who will normally be able to consider a complaint if:

- It relates to a specific public appointment;
- The complainant has clearly identified part of the Governance Code that he or she believes was breached in relation to that appointment;
- The allegation of a breach is supported by some evidence;
- A complaint has already been made to the relevant government department.

However, the Commissioner cannot consider complaints relating to:

- Disagreements about the outcome of a public appointments campaign;
- Any issue which arises before a role is advertised;
- Any issue which arises outside an appointment or reappointment process;
- The actions of any person who does not play a formal role in the process;
- The removal of any person from a public appointment;
- Matters which should be dealt with by another authority (for example, the police).

Anyone aware of an issue that meets these requirements may complain to the Commissioner's office.²⁶ The process of the office is set out in **Box 2** (overleaf).

Breaches, inquiries and investigations

The Governance Code sets out the guidance on the practices to be followed in relation to making public appointments. Deviations from the Code represent risks to public trust and the Commissioner takes them very seriously. He identifies them as breaches, investigates why they occurred and publicises them through his annual report. The purpose of publication is to ensure that departmental teams and others charged with appointment processes are aware of potential issues.

It was therefore particularly disappointing that a kind of material breach described in last year's annual report was repeated in 2023-24 by three different departments. The breaches in question relate to the disclosure of political activity by a panel member.

The Governance Code is clear on how such political activity is to be handled:

Political activity should not affect any judgement of merit nor be a bar to

²⁴ This is compared with eight complaints received by UK Government departments in 2022-23. The Welsh Government received one complaint in the same period.

²⁵ This is compared with six in 2022-23.

²⁶ The Commissioner may be reached through the contact email address of his office, <publicappointments@csc.gov.uk>.

Box 2: Complaints process of the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments

A member of the Commissioner's staff will perform an initial assessment of the complaint to understand whether the Commissioner has the authority to deal with it; given the complexities in making such an assessment, it may take a considerable period of time.

As part of this process, they may ask the complainant to answer questions about the complaint or provide additional information in support of it. If they decide the Commissioner doesn't have the authority to deal with the complaint, they will inform the complainant of their decision. If they decide the Commissioner does have the authority to deal with it, it will normally go forward to him to consider.

There may also be instances where the Commissioner has the authority to consider a complaint, but decides to appoint someone else to deal with it on his behalf. If the Commissioner, or someone acting on his behalf, can deal with a complaint, he will look into the allegation.

In a minority of cases, a formal inquiry will need to be commissioned, which may be led by an independent Investigating Officer. It is possible that the complainant will be asked to appear as a witness in the inquiry and to present evidence to the Commissioner or Investigating Officer.

Once the Commissioner has made a decision in the case, he will present his findings in a Decision Notice, published on his website.

Complainants may withdraw their complaints at any time. If withdrawn, there is no restriction on the complainant resubmitting the complaint at a later date, provided that no more than twelve months have passed since the alleged breach.

Decisions made by the Commissioner and his staff are final.

appointment or being a member of an Advisory Assessment Panel, with the exception of Senior Independent Panel Members. It should be publicly disclosed however if a panel member, or a successful candidate, has, in the last five years, been employed by a political party, held a significant office in a party, has stood as a candidate for a party in an election, has publicly spoken on behalf of a political party, or has made significant donations or loans to a party.²⁷

In 2022-23, the panel member in question was a Conservative member of the House of Lords and this political activity had not been correctly listed. In 2023-24, three departments – the Cabinet Office, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Department for Education (DfE) – were guilty of the same oversight.

In the cases of the Cabinet Office (in a campaign to appoint three new non-executive directors to the board of the UK Statistics Authority) and the FCDO (for a new non-executive director on the departmental board), the circumstances were very similar. In each case, the panel included a Conservative peer, but did not disclose the peer's party affiliation. In the case of the DfE, on a campaign to appoint two new non-executive directors to the departmental board, the panel member had made significant donations to the Conservative Party. In none of these three cases was the political activity disclosed on the role advertisement as part of the appointment process.

It is perhaps worth clarifying the meaning of the phrase 'publicly disclosed', used in the Governance Code. 'Publicly disclosed' is not equivalent to 'discoverable'. The Code

requires public disclosure of 'significant donations', those of a size which need to be reported to the Electoral Commission (EC): such donations will, by definition, be discoverable in the registers of the EC.²⁸ The further requirement of disclosure is a requirement to make this information apparent to potential candidates. The onus should never be on candidates to research the political affiliations of those who will interview them. Any political activity should be disclosed, as a minimum, in the advisory assessment panel section of the role advertisement.

The Commissioner recognises that these were honest mistakes and that there were other mitigating factors. The Cabinet Office team remedied the breach quickly when it was flagged to them and they have subsequently tightened procedures to prevent a similar occurrence in future. In both the FCDO and the DfE cases, the campaigns were cancelled before the Conservative peers were meaningfully involved. The appointments team in DfE checked the Electoral Commission's registers of donations and loans, but did not find the panel member's donation, which had been recorded under a variant spelling – perhaps an incorrect spelling – of the individual's name. The team have now revised their processes, asking sponsor teams specifically about the political activity of all panel members.

The Commissioner emphasises, though, that if departments continue to include politically active people on appointment panels, they must ensure that activity is publicly disclosed. In acting otherwise, some departments are risking damage to confidence in the public appointments system.

There were three other, more technical breaches in 2023-24.

threshold was £7,500. The change was enacted by the Representation of the People (Variation of Election Expenses, Expenditure Limits and Donation etc. Thresholds) Order 2023, <legislation.gov.uk>.

²⁷ Governance Code, section 9.2.

²⁸ From January 2024, political parties must report any donation from a single source which exceeds £11,180; before January 2024, the reporting

The Department for Work and Pensions failed to keep candidates in touch with the progress of a competition they were running, a breach of section 7.5 of the Governance Code.²⁹ Though this was regrettable, departmental officials are to be praised for their diligence in responding to the breach and establishing new processes to ensure the error is not repeated. Officials say they now work with a flow chart and a tracker and that the chair of the advisory assessment panel now contacts unsuccessful candidates before the successful candidate is announced.

The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) launched a campaign before receiving approval from the Commissioner on the minister's choice of SIPM. The Governance Code states that 'Ministers must agree who the SIPM should be for each competition and should consult the Commissioner for Public Appointments ahead of the process commencing'.³⁰ This technical breach was the result of a keenness to proceed as quickly as possible. DSIT officials reported they held a 'lessons learned' session and have since put in place measures that will prevent the situation arising again.

The Welsh Government notified the Commissioner of exceptional extensions to the terms of a chair and a member of the Life Sciences Hub Wales Board. In both cases, however, the notifications came four months after the two individuals had begun their extensions. Welsh Government officials explained that this was the result of an administrative error and spoke to the Commissioner's office about actions they would take to prevent a recurrence.

²⁹ The section reads as follows: 'Departments are responsible for engaging with candidates and providing a good service to individuals who have applied for appointments. Candidates should be kept in touch with progress of competitions and,

where possible, be informed of key dates (sift, longlist, interview) ahead of time.' Governance Code, section 7.5.

³⁰ Governance Code, section 6.2.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments financial information

In order to deliver his responsibilities, the Commissioner is supported by a small number of civil servants who are on secondment from the Cabinet Office to the independent Civil Service Commission (CSC) secretariat. The budget and expenditure of the office, as well as those of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, are incorporated within the Commission's overall budget and expenditure.

The honorarium paid to the Commissioner and the salaries of his staff comprise the vast majority of the office's direct costs, with small additional sums being spent on travel and subsistence so that the Commissioner can support engagement and outreach events held across the UK.

In 2023-24, the office's net expenditure was £295,000, of which £62,000 was Commissioner fees.³¹ This represented a rise of 3% from 2022-23, when the equivalent figure was £286,000.³²

Appendix 2: Full list of consultations and notifications

Article 2(4) cases: Newly regulated bodies

Where a provisional appointment is to be made before a public body or public office exists in law or before a body or office has been specified as a public body or public office for the purposes of the Order in Council, the Minister for the Cabinet Office may notify the Commissioner that the appointment is to be treated as if it were a public appointment to a

public body or public office for the purposes of this Order.

1. The Office for Place was added to the list of regulated bodies on 2 January 2024.
2. The Independent Football Regulator was added to the list of regulated bodies, with the chair role becoming a significant appointment, also on 2 January 2024.

Section 3.1 cases: Delegations

Ministers may, where they have the power to do so, choose to delegate responsibility for certain appointments to the appropriate body in question to run and make appointments. This should be agreed with the Cabinet Office and the Commissioner for Public Appointments, along with any exemptions from this Code as necessary.

None in 2023-24.

Section 3.2 cases: Unappointable candidates

Ministers should consider the advice of Advisory Assessment Panels but are not bound by their views. Ministers may therefore reject a panel's advice on the merit of candidates and choose to re-run a competition with a new panel. Ministers may choose to appoint someone who is not deemed 'appointable' by the Advisory Assessment Panel. In this case, they must consult the Commissioner for Public Appointments in good time before a public announcement and will be required to justify their decision publicly.

None in 2023-24.

³¹ This amounts to 13% of the CSC's budget of £2.248mn. Civil Service Commission, 'Annual Report and Accounts 2023/24' (12 December 2024), <civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk>, p.

90; hereafter CSC, 'Annual Report and Accounts 2023/24'.

³² CSC, 'Annual Report and Accounts 2023/24'. This amounted to 12% of the CSC's budget of £2.427mn.

Section 3.3: Direct appointments

In exceptional cases, Ministers may decide to appoint a candidate without a competition. They must make this decision public alongside their reasons for doing so. They must consult the Commissioner for Public Appointments in good time before the appointment is publicly announced.

Department	Body	Role(s)	Length	Rationale
AGO	HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate	Chief Inspector	Nine months	Unplanned vacancy
Cabinet Office	Senior Salaries Review Body	Chair and two members	Five months, six months and 12 months	Planned recruitment and to ensure continuity
DCMS	Historic Royal Palaces	Chair	Six months	Planned recruitment
DCMS	British Broadcasting Corporation	Chair	12 months	Unplanned vacancy
DCMS	Big Lottery Fund (The National Lottery Community Fund)	Chair	12 months	Unplanned vacancy
DCMS	Geffrye Museum	Chair	Six months	Unplanned vacancy
DCMS	Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C)	Chair	12 months	Planned recruitment
DCMS	Victoria and Albert Museum	Chair	12 months	Planned recruitment
Defra	Joint Nature Conservation Committee	Chair	Six months	Planned recruitment
Defra	Regional Flood and Coastal Committees	Chair	Six months	Planned recruitment
Defra	Joint Nature Conservation Committee	Chair	Six months	Planned recruitment
Defra	Covent Garden Market Authority	Chair	Four months	Planned recruitment
Defra	Joint Nature Conservation Committee	Chair	Three months	Unplanned vacancy
DESNZ	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority	Chair	Six months	Planned recruitment
DESNZ	Climate Change Committee	Chair	Nine months	Planned recruitment
DESNZ	UK Atomic Energy Authority	Chair	Six months	Planned recruitment
DESNZ	Climate Change Committee	Chair	Nine months	Planned recruitment
DfE	Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation (Ofqual)	Chief Regulator	12 months	Planned recruitment
DfE	Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation (Ofqual)	Chair	12 months	Unplanned vacancy
DfE	Social Work England	Chair	Three months	Planned recruitment
DfT	National Highways Limited	Chair	Three months	Planned recruitment
DHSC	Food Standards Agency	Deputy chair	Six months	Planned recruitment
DHSC	NHS England	Member	Eight months	To ensure continuity

Department	Body	Role(s)	Length	Rationale
DHSC	NHS Pay Review Body	Chair	Seven months	Planned recruitment
DSIT	Natural Environment Research Council	Executive Chair	Six months	Planned recruitment
DSIT	Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council	Executive Chair	Six months	Planned recruitment
DSIT	Medical Research Council	Executive Chair	Three months	Planned recruitment
DWP	Pensions Ombudsman	Deputy Ombudsman	18 months	To ensure continuity
DWP	Pensions Ombudsman	Deputy Ombudsman	Nine months	To ensure continuity
DWP	Office for Nuclear Regulation	Chair	18 months	Unplanned vacancy
DWP	Departmental Board of the Department for Work and Pensions	Lead NED	18 months	Planned recruitment
Home Office	Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner	Commissioner	Seven months	Body being disestablished
MoD	Veterans Advisory and Pensions Committees	Chair	Five months	Unplanned vacancy
MoD	Defence Nuclear Safety Expert Committee	Chair	12 months	To ensure continuity
MoD	Veterans Advisory and Pensions Committees	Chair	Five months	Unplanned vacancy
MoD	Veterans Advisory and Pensions Committees	Chair	Three months	Planned recruitment
MoJ	Sentencing Council for England and Wales	Member	Six months	Unplanned vacancy
MoJ	Parole Board	Six members	Two for two years, two for three years, two for four years	To ensure continuity
MoJ	HM Chief Inspector of Probation	Chief Inspector	Five months	Unplanned vacancy
MoJ	Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses (Victims' Commissioner)	Victims' Commissioner	12 months	Planned recruitment
MoJ	Independent Monitoring Authority	Chair	Nine months	Unplanned vacancy
MoJ	Sentencing Council for England and Wales	Member	Five years	To ensure continuity
Welsh Government	Welsh Ambulance Services National Health Service Trust	Vice chair	12 months	Planned recruitment
Welsh Government	Hywel Dda University Health Board	Chair	Four months	Planned recruitment
Welsh Government	Welsh Ambulance Services National Health Service Trust	Vice chair	Nine months	Planned recruitment
Welsh Government	Powys Teaching Health Board	Member	Seven months	Unplanned vacancy
Welsh Government	Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales	Chair	12 months	Planned recruitment

Section 3.6: Length of tenure

Subject to any statutory provisions, it is for ministers to decide on length of tenure. However, there is a strong presumption that no individual should serve more than two terms or serve in any one post for more than ten years. In exceptional cases, ministers may decide an individual's skills and expertise is needed beyond such a tenure. In such cases, the Commissioner should be notified.

Department	Body	Role(s)	Service	Length
DCMS	Sports Grounds Safety Authority	Member	Two terms	Six months
DCMS	Natural History Museum	Member	Two terms	Two years
Defra	Regional Flood and Coastal Committees	Three chairs	Two terms (all)	One for two years, two for three years
Defra	Sea Fish Industry Authority	Member	Two terms	12 months
DESNZ	UK Atomic Energy Authority	Chair	Six months	Six months
DfE	Further Education Commissioner's Office	Deputy Further Education Commissioner	Two terms	Two years
DfE	Office for Students	Member	Two terms	Three years
DfE	LocatEd	Member	Two terms	Three years
DfT	Network Rail	Chair	Three terms	Two years
DfT	Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee	Four members	Two terms (all)	Two years (all)
		Five members	Three terms (all)	12 months (all)
DHSC	British Pharmacopoeia Commission	Two members	Two terms (both)	One for two years, one for four years
DHSC	Departmental Board of the Department of Health and Social Care	Member	Three terms	Six months
HMT	Crown Estate Commissioners	Chair	Two terms	12 months
Home Office	Biometric and Forensics Ethics Group	Three members	Two terms (all)	Three years (all)
Home Office	Independent Family Returns Panel	Two members	Two terms (both)	Three years (both)
Home Office	HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services	Member (HM Inspector)	Two terms	Six months
Home Office	Disclosure and Barring Service	Chair	Two terms	Two years
Home Office	Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs	Two members	Ten years (both)	Eight months (both)
Home Office	Migration Advisory Committee	Member	Two terms	Three years
Home Office	Animals in Science Committee	Member	Two terms	Three years
		Five members	Two terms (all)	Nine months (all)
MoD	Independent Monitoring Board for the Military Corrective Training Centre	Two members	Two terms/ ten years (both)	Five years (both)

Department	Body	Role(s)	Service	Length
MoJ	National Chair of the Independent Monitoring Boards	Chair	Two terms	Three months
MoJ	National Council of Lay Observers	Chair	Two terms	Three months
MoJ	Parole Board	Member	Two terms/ ten years	Five years
MoJ	Advisory Committees on Justices of the Peace	18 members	Ten years (all)	Three years
Welsh Government	Awdurdod Parc Cenedlaethol Bannau Brycheiniog / Brecon Beacons National	Member	Two terms	Two years
Welsh Government	Life Sciences Hub Wales Board	Chair	Two terms	Six months
		Member	Two terms	Six months

Section 6.1: Significant appointments

A list of 'significant appointments' should be agreed by Ministers and the Commissioner for Public Appointments and published. These competitions must have a Senior Independent Panel Member (SIPM) on their Advisory Assessment Panels. A SIPM is an individual who is familiar with senior recruitment, the Public Appointments Principles and this Governance Code. SIPMs should be independent of the department and of the body concerned and should not be currently politically active.

1. The chair of the Independent Monitoring Authority was added to the list of significant appointments on 18 January 2024.

Section 6.2: Senior Independent Panel Members

Summary of departmental lists of Senior Independent Panels Members used on campaigns in 2022-23. The list relates to chairs or chief commissioners unless otherwise indicated.

Department	Body	Name of SIPM
Cabinet Office	Committee on Standards in Public Life	Bill Bush
Cabinet Office	House of Lords Appointment Commission	Ron Kalifa
Cabinet Office	Senior Salaries Review Body	Warren East
		Cressida Hogg
DCMS	Science Museum Group	Wanda Goldwag
DCMS	National Gallery, trustee	Charles McKay
DCMS	British Broadcasting Corporation	Ron Kalifa
DCMS	British Film Institute	Vikki Heywood
DCMS	Royal Museums Greenwich	Sir Philip Augar
DCMS	The Royal Parks	Clare Scherrer

Department	Body	Name of SIPM
DCMS	Big Lottery Fund (The National Lottery Community Fund)	Julia Mizen
DCMS	Tate, four trustees	Justin Maciejewski
DCMS	National Portrait Gallery, trustee	Lord Kamlesh Patel
DCMS	British Museum, four trustees	Duncan Wilson
DCMS	Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C)	Libby Watkins
DCMS	Natural History Museum, two trustees	Howell James
DCMS	Victoria and Albert Museum	Elizabeth Buchanan
DCMS	Imperial War Museum, three trustees	Monisha Shah
DCMS	Victoria and Albert Museum	Alan Coppin
DCMS	Independent Football Regulator	Lord Paul Bew
DESNZ	Gas and Electricity Markets Authority	Dame Patricia Hodgson
DESNZ	Future Systems Operator	Perdita Fraser
DESNZ	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority	Irene Dorner
DfE	Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation (Ofqual)	Clare Wagner
DfT	National Highways Limited	Olivia Grant
DSIT	Departmental Board of the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology	Perdita Fraser
FCDO	Independent Commission for Aid Impact	Libby Watkins
HMT	Crown Estate Commissioners	Debbie Gillatt
Home Office	Independent Office for Police Conduct	Rosie Varley
Home Office	Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration	Sahil Mahtani
MoJ	HM Chief Inspector of Probation	Sir Peter Rubin
MoJ	Independent Monitoring Authority	Lord Paul Bew
Welsh Government	Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board	Arun Midha
Welsh Government	Older People's Commissioner for Wales	Ruth Marks
Welsh Government	Swansea Bay University Health Board	Rosetta Plumber

Appendix 3.1.1: List of bodies and offices regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments

A list of bodies and roles regulated by the Commissioner can be found in Schedule 1 of the Public Appointments Order in Council, the most recent version of which is available [here](#). The list of bodies is updated whenever a new Order is prepared and published by the Privy Council. In between the publication of revised Orders, ministers are able to agree with the Commissioner any new roles that should be regulated, through a consultation process described in Section 2(4) of the Order.

Attorney General's Office

Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy

Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service
British Business Bank, Chair only
British Hallmarking Council
Central Arbitration Committee
Certification Officer
Civil Nuclear Police Authority
Coal Authority
Committee on Climate Change
Committee on Fuel Poverty
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management
Competition and Markets Authority Board
Competition Appeal Tribunal
Competition Service
Electricity Settlements Company Ltd, Chair and Senior Independent Director only
Financial Reporting Council
Future System Operator
Gas and Electricity Markets Authority
Groceries Code Adjudicator
Labour Market Enforcement Director
Land Registry
Low Carbon Contracts Company Ltd, Chair and Senior Independent Director Only
Low Pay Commission
National Nuclear Laboratory
National Physical Laboratory (NPL) Management Ltd, Chair only
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
Nuclear Liabilities Fund
Oil and Gas Authority, Chair only
Ordnance Survey, Chair only
Post Office Ltd, Chair only
Pubs Code Adjudicator and Deputy Pubs Code Adjudicator
Regulatory Policy Committee
Small Business Commissioner
UK Atomic Energy Authority
UK Research and Innovation
Trade Remedies Authority

Cabinet Office

Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, excluding political members
Boundary Commission for England

Boundary Commission for Wales
Civil Service Pensions Board
Committee on Standards in Public Life, excluding political appointments
Equality and Human Rights Commission
House of Lords Appointment Commission, excluding political members
Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists
Security Vetting Appeals Panel
Senior Salaries Review Body
UK Statistics Authority Board

Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport

The Advisory Council on National Records and Archives
Arts Council England
Big Lottery Fund (The National Lottery Community Fund)
Birmingham Organising Committee for the 2022 Commonwealth Games Ltd
British Broadcasting Corporation
British Film Institute
British Library
British Museum
Charity Commission for England and Wales
Gambling Commission
Geffrye Museum
Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England
Historic Royal Palaces
Horniman Public Museum and Public Park Trust
Horse Race Betting Levy Board
Imperial War Museum
Information Commissioner
National Citizen Service Trust
National Gallery
National Heritage Memorial Fund/Heritage Lottery Fund (The National Lottery Heritage Fund)
National Museums Liverpool
National Portrait Gallery
Natural History Museum
Office of Communications (OFCOM)
Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art and Objects of Cultural Interest
Royal Armouries
Royal Museums Greenwich
Science Museum Group
Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C)
Sport England

Sports Grounds Safety Authority
Tate
The Royal Parks
Theatres Trust
Treasure Valuation Committee
UK Sport
United Kingdom Anti-Doping Ltd
Victoria and Albert Museum
VisitBritain
VisitEngland
Wallace Collection

Department for Education

Adoption and Special Guardianship Leadership Board, Chair only
Child Safeguarding Practice Review Panel
Children's Commissioner for England
Construction Industry Training Board
Engineering Construction Industry Training Board
Film Industry Training Board
Further Education Commissioner's Office, Further Education Commissioner and Deputy Further Education Commissioner only
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Education, Children's Services and Skills
Independent Assessors for Student Finance, Appeals and Complaints
Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education
LocatEd
Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted)
Office for Students
Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation (Ofqual)
Residential Care Leadership Board, Chair only
School Teachers' Review Body
Social Mobility Commission
Social Work England
Student Loans Company Ltd

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment
Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board
British Wool Marketing Board
Broads Authority
Conservation Board for the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, with the exception of parish members
Conservation Board for the Cotswolds Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, with the exception of parish members
Consumer Council for Water
Covent Garden Market Authority
Environment Agency

Forestry Commission
Joint Nature Conservation Committee
Marine Management Organisation
National Park Authorities, with the exception of parish members
Natural England
Regional Flood and Coastal Committees, Chair only
Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew
Science Advisory Council
Sea Fish Industry Authority
Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT)

Department for International Development

CDC Group Plc
Commonwealth Scholarship Commission
Independent Commission for Aid Impact

Department for Transport

British Transport Police Authority
Civil Aviation Authority
Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee
Dover Harbour Board, Chair only
East West Rail Company
Harwich Haven Authority, Chair only
Highways England, Chair only
HS2 Ltd
Independent Commission on Civil Aviation Noise
London and Continental Railways Ltd
Milford Haven Port Authority, Chair only
Network Rail, Chair only
Office of Rail and Road
Port of London Authority, Chair only
Port of Tyne Authority, Chair only
Traffic Commissioners
Transport Focus

Department for Work and Pensions

BPDTS Ltd
Health and Safety Executive
Industrial Injuries Advisory Council
Money and Pensions Service
National Employment Savings Trust
Office for Nuclear Regulation
Pension Protection Fund, Chair only
Pension Protection Fund Ombudsman
Pensions Ombudsman
Pensions Regulator
Social Security Advisory Committee

Department of Health and Social Care

Advisory Committee on Clinical Excellence Awards, Chair and Medical Director only
Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation, Chair only
British Pharmacopoeia Commission
Care Quality Commission
Commission on Human Medicines

Committee on Mutagenicity of Chemicals in Food,
Consumer Products and the Environment
Food Standards Agency
Health and Social Care Information Centre (NHS
Digital)
Health Education England
Health Research Authority
Health Services Safety Investigations Body
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
Human Tissue Authority
Independent Reconfiguration Panel
Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigations
Special Health Authority
Monitor (part of the operating body known as NHS
Improvement)
National Data Guardian
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
NHS Blood and Transplant
NHS Business Services Authority
NHS Commissioning Board (NHS England)
NHS Counter Fraud Authority
NHS Litigation Authority (NHS Resolution)
NHS Pay Review Body
NHS Trust Development Authority (part of the
operating body known as NHS Improvement)
NHS Trusts
Office for Strategic Coordination of Health
Research, Chair only
Patient Safety Commissioner
Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists'
Remuneration

**Export Credits Guarantee Department (UK Export
Finance)**

Export Guarantee Advisory Council

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Great Britain-China Centre
Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission
Westminster Foundation for Democracy

HM Treasury

Court of Directors of the Bank of England, with the
exception of the Governor and Deputy
Governors
Crown Estate Commissioners
Financial Conduct Authority
National Savings and Investments
Royal Mint Advisory Committee on the Design of
Coins, Medals, Seals and Decorations
UK Government Investments

Home Office

Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs
Animals in Science Committee
Appointed Person under the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002

Biometric and Forensics Ethics Group
College of Policing Board of Directors
Commissioner for the Retention and Use of
Biometric Material
Disclosure and Barring Service
Forensic Science Regulator
Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and
Fire & Rescue Services
Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and
Immigration
Independent Family Returns Panel
Independent Monitor of the Disclosure and Barring
Service
Independent Office for Police Conduct
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation
Members of the Visiting Committee of any
immigration removal centre or short-term
holding facility
Migration Advisory Committee
National Crime Agency Remuneration Review Body
Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner
Police Advisory Board for England and Wales
Police Remuneration Review Body
Security Industry Authority
Surveillance Camera Commissioner
Technical Advisory Board (for the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000), with the
exception of Agency Members

Ministry of Defence

Armed Forces Pay Review Body
Defence Nuclear Safety Committee
Independent Medical Expert Group
Independent Monitoring Board for the Military
Corrective Training Centre
Nuclear Research Advisory Council
Oil and Pipelines Agency
Royal Air Force Museum
Science Advisory Committee on the Medical
Implications of Less-Lethal Weapons
Service Complaints Ombudsman
Service Police Complaints Commissioner
Single Source Regulations Office
Veterans Advisory and Pensions Committees

**Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local
Government**

Architects Registration Board
Building Regulation Advisory Committee
Commission for Local Administration in England
(Local Government and Social Care
Ombudsman)
Ebbsfleet Development Corporation
Homes England
Leasehold Advisory Service (LEASE)

Regulator of Social Housing
The Housing Ombudsman
Valuation Tribunal Service

Ministry of Justice

Advisory Committees on Justices of the Peace
Advisory Council on Conscientious Objectors
Chair of the National Council of Prisoner Escort
and Custody Services Lay Observers
Children and Family Court Advisory and Support
Service
Civil Justice Council
Civil Procedure Rule Committee
Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses (Victims'
Commissioner)
Court Examiners
Court of Protection Visitors
Criminal Cases Review Commission
Criminal Procedure Rule Committee
Family Procedure Rule Committee
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Probation
Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody
Independent Monitoring Board of any prison or
young offender institution
Insolvency Rules Committee
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman
Judicial Appointments Commission
Judicial Pension Board, independent Chair and
independent members only
Law Commission, with the exception of the Chair
Legal Services Board
Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements Lay
Advisers
National Chair of the Independent Monitoring
Boards
National Mental Capacity Forum, Chair only
Non-Judicial Members of Disciplinary Panels of the
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Parole Board, with the exception of judicial
members
Persons appointed by the Lord Chancellor under
section 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
Prisoner Escort and Custody Services Lay
Observers
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman
Prison Service Pay Review Body
Sentencing Council for England and Wales
Tribunal Procedure Committee
Youth Justice Board for England and Wales

Northern Ireland Office

Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland
Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland
Equality Commission for Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
Parades Commission for Northern Ireland

Scotland Office

Boundary Commission for Scotland

Welsh Government

Advisory Panel to the Welsh Language
Commissioner
Agricultural Advisory Panel for Wales
All Wales Medicines Strategy Group
All Wales Programme Monitoring Committee for
the European Structural Funds
Amgueddfa Cymru - National Museum of Wales
Aneurin Bevan Community Health Council
Aneurin Bevan University Local Health Board
Animal Health and Welfare Framework Group
Arts Council of Wales
Betsi Cadwaladr Community Health Council
Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
Board of Community Health Councils
Brecon Beacons National Park Authority
Cardiff & Vale Community Health Council
Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
Career Choices Dewis Gyrfa
Children's Commissioner for Wales
Commissioner for Older People in Wales
Cwm Taf Morgannwg Community Health Council
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health
Board
Design Commission for Wales
Digital Health and Care Wales
Education & Skills Ministerial Advisory Group
Education Workforce Council
Future Generations Commissioner
Health Education Improvement Wales
Higher Education Funding Council for Wales
Hybu Cig Cymru
Hywel Dda Community Health Council
Hywel Dda University Health Board
Independent Remuneration Panel for Wales
Industry Wales
Life Sciences Hub Wales Board
Local Government Boundary Commission for
Wales
National Academy for Educational Leadership
National Adviser for Violence against Women and
other forms of Gender-based Violence,
Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence
National Library of Wales
Natural Resources Wales
Pembrokeshire Coast National Park Authority
Powys Community Health Council
Powys Teaching Health Board
Public Health Wales NHS Trust
Qualifications Wales

Regulatory Board for Wales
Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical
Monuments of Wales
Snowdonia National Park Authority
Social Care Wales
Sports Council for Wales
Swansea Bay Community Health Council

Swansea Bay University Local Health Board
Velindre National Health Services Trust
Welsh Ambulance Services National Health Service
Trust
Welsh Industrial Development Advisory Board
Welsh Language Commissioner
Welsh Revenue Authority

Appendix 3.2: List of significant appointments requiring a Senior Independent Panel Member

A list of 'significant appointments' has been agreed by ministers and the Commissioner. These appointments are distinguished by the fact that Senior Independent Panel Members are appointed to the Advisory Assessment Panels supporting the relevant minister to find a suitable candidate for the role. Because these appointments are deemed to be particularly important, the SIPM provides additional assurance that the Governance Code and Principles of Public Appointments have been adhered to during a campaign. The list relates to chairs of bodies unless otherwise indicated.

Cabinet Office

Advisory Committee on Business Appointments
Committee on Standards in Public Life
Equality and Human Rights Commission
House of Lords Appointments Commission
Senior Salaries Review Body
UK Statistics Authority

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy

ACAS
British Business Bank plc
Certification Officer
Committee on Climate Change
Competition and Markets Authority
Future Systems Operator
Groceries Code Adjudicator
Innovate UK
Land Registry
Low Pay Commission
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
Post Office Ltd
Pubs Code Adjudicator
UK Green Investment Bank
UKRI

Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport

Arts Council England
British Film Institute
British Library
British Museum
BBC
Big Lottery Fund
Charity Commission for England and Wales
Gambling Commission
Heritage Lottery Fund
Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for
England

Historic Royal Palaces
Information Commissioner
National Citizen Service
National Museums Liverpool
Office of Communications (Ofcom)
Science Museum Group
Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C)
Sport England
The Royal Parks
UK Sport
Victoria and Albert Museum
VisitBritain
Imperial War Museum
National Gallery
National Portrait Gallery
Natural History Museum
Royal Museums Greenwich
Tate
Wallace Collection

Ministry of Defence

Service Complaints Ombudsman
Service Police Complaints Commissioner

Department for Education

Children's Commissioner for England
HM Chief Inspector of Education, Children's
Services and Skills
Ofqual
Ofsted
Office for Students
Student Loans Company
Social Mobility Commission

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Environment Agency
Forestry Commission
Kew

Natural England
Office of Environmental Protection
Water Services Regulatory Authority

Department for Health and Social Care

Care Quality Commission
Food Standards Agency
Health Services Safety Investigations Body
Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority
Independent Patient Safety Commissioner
NHS Commissioning Board (NHS England)
NHS Improvement
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence

Department for Transport

British Transport Police Authority
Civil Aviation Authority
Highways England
HS2 Ltd
Network Rail
Office of Road and Rail

Department for Work and Pensions

Health and Safety Executive
Pensions Ombudsman
Pension Protection Fund Ombudsman
Pensions Regulator
Social Security Advisory Committee

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

Independent Commission for Aid Impact

Home Office

Director General of Independent Office for Police Conduct
HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation
Independent Anti-Slavery Commission

Northern Ireland Office

Equality Commission for Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
Chief Electoral Officer

HM Treasury

Court of Directors of the Bank of England
Crown Estate Commissioners
Financial Conduct Authority

Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities

Homes England
Regulator of Social Housing

Local Commissioners for Administration in England
(Local Government and Social Care
Ombudsman)

Ministry of Justice

Criminal Cases Review Commission
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons
HM Chief Inspector of Probation
Prison and Probation Ombudsman
Youth Justice Board for England & Wales

Welsh Government

Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board
Amgueddfa Cymru – National Museum Wales
Aneurin Bevan University Health Board
Arts Council of Wales
Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
Cardiff & Vale University Health Board
Care Council for Wales
Children's Commissioner for Wales
Commissioner for Older People in Wales
Cwm Taf University Health Board
Digital Health and Care Wales
Future Generations Commissioner
Higher Education Funding Council for Wales
Hywel Dda University Health Board
National Library of Wales
Natural Resources Wales
Powys Teaching Health Board
Qualification Wales
Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales
Sports Council for Wales
Velindre NHS Trust
Welsh Ambulance Service NHS Trust
Welsh Language Commissioner

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